Implementation of a hypertext transfer protocol server on a high assurance multilevel secure platform by Bersack, Evelyn Louise
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2000
Implementation of a hypertext transfer protocol
server on a high assurance multilevel secure platform
Bersack, Evelyn Louise
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/9236
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
THESIS 
IMPLEMENTATION OF A HYPERTEXT TRANSFER 
PROTOCOL SERVER ON A 








Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
20010215 017 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE F onn Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for 
reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and 
reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of 
information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of 
Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
December 2000 Master's Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE : Implementation of a HyperText Transfer Protocol 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
Server on a High Assurance Multilevel Secure Platform 
6. AUTHOR(S) Evelyn Louise Bersack 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
9. SPONSORING I MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING I MONITORING 
ADDRESS(ES) AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
NIA 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION I AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
In a client/server environment on a local area network (LAN), a server should provide various network applications 
including a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) server. HTTP is a client/server, request/response application protocol that is 
used on the World Wide Web (WWW). It provides the definition and means for transferring objects across internets. A server 
used in the context of a multilevel secure (MLS) LAN should be no exception. A MLS LAN should be capable of providing an 
HTTP web server that can be used by commercially available web browsers executing on client workstations. This server 
needs to be aware of the MLS environment and provide clients access to all web pages and objects for which they are 
authorized. 
This thesis implements an HTTP web server running on a high assurance host in a MLS LAN. The web server is based on a 
commercially available web server application. The commercially available application has been modified and configured to 
run on the high assurance host. This thesis discusses the details for implementing the web server on the high assurance host. 
The result of this thesis is an HTTP web server application that runs on a high assurance host servicing clients on a MLS 
LAN that are using commercially available web browsers. These clients now have the capability of web browsing at varying 
levels of classification on one workstation. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Hypertext Transfer Protocol, Web Server, Multilevel Secure, Local Area 
Network, High Assurance 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 
OF REPORT CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICA TIO 
PAGE N OF ABSTRACT 
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified 
NSN 7540-01-280-5500 
15. NUMBER OF PAGES 
144 
16. PRICE CODE 
20. LIMITATION OF 
ABSTRACT 
UL 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
THIS PAGE JNTENTIONALL Y LEFf BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
IMPLE:MENTATION OF A HYPERTEXT TRANSFER PROTOCOL SERVER 
ONA 
HIGH ASSURANCE MULTILEVEL SECURE PLATFORM 
Evelyn Louise Bersack 
Civilian, United States Army 
B.S., University of Arizona, 1986 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 




NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
December 2000 
Computer Science Department 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
In a client/server environment on a local area network (LAN), a server should 
provide various network applications including a hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) 
server. HTTP is a client/server, request/response application protocol that is used on the 
World Wide Web (WWW). It provides the definition and means for transferring objects 
across intemets. A server used in the context of a multilevel secure (MLS) LAN should 
be no exception. A MLS LAN should be capable of providing an HTTP web server that 
can be used by commercially available web browsers executing on client workstations. 
This server needs to be aware of the MLS environment and provide clients access to all 
web pages and objects for which they are authorized. 
This thesis implements an HTTP web server running on a high assurance host in a 
MLS LAN. The web server is based on a commercially available web server application. 
The commercially available application has been modified and configured to run on the 
high assurance host. This thesis discusses the details for implementing the web server on 
the high assurance host. 
The result of this thesis is an HTTP web server application that runs on a high 
assurance host servicing clients on a MLS LAN that are using commercially available 
web browsers. These clients now have the capability of web browsing at varying levels of 
classification on one workstation. 
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In a client-server environment on a local area network, the server should support 
and provide various network applications such as File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Simple 
Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Telnet (a remote login facility), and HyperText Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP). A server used in the context of multilevel secure (MLS) local area 
network (LAN) should be no exception and provide these same network applications. A 
MLS LAN should be able to provide network applications that are capable of running at 
multiple security levels based on the level of the session between the client and server. 
By providing an HTTP application on a server in a MLS LAN, the server can now 
provide web-browsing capabilities to its clients running at different session levels. This 
would allow clients to use a web browser to access web pages, documentation, graphic 
images, and other information on the server at varying levels of security classifications. 
The HTTP application on the server must be aware of the MLS environment and be 
configured to know what level of classification and assurance the client is requesting. It 
should also be able to provide the correct level of access to its web pages and 
information. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Several research questions are addressed in this thesis. The majority of the 
questions deal directly with implementing an HTTP server on a high assurance platform, 
more specifically the Apache web server package [Ref. 1]. Access control to the web 
pages that are being served is also a concern. The negotiation of the contents of the pages 
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that the server can access is not investigated. For this implementation, the server should 
have no idea about the contents of the pages it is serving to its client but be concerned 
about whether it has access to the objects the client is requesting. 
The following questions are specifically addressed in this thesis. 
1. Can the "Apache" software package be modified to run on the Wang XTS-
300? 
2. How difficult will it be to port the existing "Apache" software onto the XTS-
300 platform? 
3. Which version of the "Apache" software should be used? 
4. Will there be any side effects that would adversely affect enforcement of 
access control policies? 
5. Will the evaluation rating or trustworthiness of the system be adversely 
affected by the addition of an HTTP server? Will additional trusted code be 
required to support the server? 
6. Will the modified "Apache" software package be easily maintainable across 
future upgrades to the XTS-300 STOP Operating system and/or "Apache" 
software? 
C. OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this thesis is to implement and test an Apache-based HTTP Web 
Server application on a high assurance host operating in a Multilevel Secure (MLS) Local 
Area Network (LAN) operating at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Center for 
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INFOSEC Studies and Research Laboratory. This application will be implemented using 
a software package called Apache. Apache is available free from the Apache Software 
Foundation and can be downloaded from the Apache Software Foundation web site at 
www.apache.org [Ref. 2]. The Apache package is to be implemented on a Wang XTS-
300 computer running the STOP-4.4.2, UNIX-like operating system [Ref. 3]. The goal of 
this undertaking is to provide a low cost commercially available HTTP Web Server 
application that can be configured and easily maintained on the XTS-300 platform. 
D. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
In a typical environment that handles classified information, the information is 
stored on some type of removable storage device that is kept locked and secured in a safe. 
When access to the information is needed, the storage device is removed from the safe 
and used in an isolated environment. When the user is finished with the information, the 
storage device is returned to the safe. There must be strict documented access security 
policies and procedures in place in this type of environment to ensure the prevention of 
disclosure and/or penetration of the information. Occasionally, the policies and 
procedures are not followed, and the information is compromised. 
A high assurance multilevel secure (MLS) workstation eliminates the need for this 
type of environment. Information at all levels of classification can reside on the same 
high assurance MLS workstation. The high assurance MLS workstation enforces a strict 
access control policy that prevents the unwarranted disclosure and penetration of 
information. 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) conducts and supports testing programs and 
maneuvers that produce test information at all levels of classification. If this information 
resides on a high assurance MLS workstation, it will be protected by the access control 
policies in place on that platform. A drawback with using a high assurance MLS 
workstation is that in order for users (Program Managers, Test Engineers, and customers) 
to access their information they must have direct access to the host. This is an impractical 
restriction to place on the users, but allowing them access to the information through a 
network and COTS web browser is practical. To support this COTS web browser, a 
HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) web sever application must be available on the high 
assurance MLS host. This high assurance MLS host could then be configured to act as an 
HTTP server in a MLS LAN environment. The users would not need direct access to the 
host but only require a client workstation, equipped with a COTS web browsing 
application, configured on the MLS LAN. The HTTP server, constrained by the access 
control policies enforced by the high assurance MLS host, allows users access to 
information that is centrally located but available to only authorized and identified users. 
Information served through such an HTTP server in a MLS LAN environment would not 
be vulnerable to unwarranted penetration and disclosure. The MLS LAN provides the 
same degree of security and access control that the stand-alone MLS host provides while 
allowing users the advantage of using their workstation and COTS web browsing 
application. 
This solution is more practical and beneficial. All levels of data and information 
reside on a MLS host preventing the need for separate storage devices at different 
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classification levels that must be kept locked in a safe. The access control policies are 
strictly enforced by the MLS host and are not left up to chance by relying on the user to 
follow documented procedures. It is practical because most offices have COTS 
workstations with COTS web browsing applications. Special "custom-built" applications 
and programs are not needed to access the information, just a COTS workstation 
enhanced to be a trusted client on the MLS LAN with a COTS web browsing application 
is required. This thesis aims to provide the HTTP server application hosted on the high 
assurance MLS workstation so this benefit can be achieved. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II provides background material on the HyperText Transfer Protocol, the 
Apache Software Foundation Apache Web Server Package, the XTS-300 Platform, and 
the NPS Multilevel Secure Local Area Network Project. 
Chapter ill discusses the design constraints and source code requirements needed 
to implement an Apache-based server on a host in a MLS LAN environment and how 
these requirements can be met. It also discusses some of the initial problems encountered 
while trying to satisfy these constraints and requirements. 
Chapter IV outlines the phases used to implement the Apache-based server. It 
highlights the changes made to the configuration files that were used to create the 
Makefiles for the C language source code compilation. It details the parameters used in 
the platform-dependent configuration C language header file. It discusses the major 
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changes to the C language source code to enable the server to run in a MLS LAN 
environment. 
Chapter V discusses some security considerations surrounding the Apache-based 
server. It describes some of the Apache add-on modules that are or could be considered 
security related. It provides a brief discussion on Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and its 
inclusion into an Apache-based server. 
Chapter VI answers the questions asked in this chapter. It suggests some topics for 
future work related to this thesis. 
There are several Appendices in this thesis. Appendix A is a glossary of terms and 
acronyms. Appendix B is a complete directory listing of files on the XTS-300. Appendix 
Cis the Apache Software License File. Appendices D-H are Apache files that have been 
modified for this Apache-based server implementation. Appendix I provides a listing of 
Apache add-on modules provided with the Apache server software package. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides background information on the HyperText Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP), the Apache Software Package, the Wang XTS-300, and the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Multilevel Secure (MLS) Local Area Network (LAN) Project. 
A. HYPERTEXT TRANSFER PROTOCOL 
The HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a client/server, request/response 
application protocol that runs on top of TCP (Transmission Control Protocol). TCP is an 
internet transport protocol that is connection-oriented and has a reliable data transfer 
service as well as congestion control mechanism [Ref. 2]. The application that most 
widely uses HTTP is the World Wide Web (WWW). HTTP has been used in the web 
since 1990 and has now gained the position as the most used protocol on the Internet 
[Ref. 4]. The protocol defines the format of the messages that can be passed between a 
client, usually a web browser such as Netscape Communicator or Microsoft Internet 
Explorer, and a server such as Apache, Microsoft Internet Information Server, or 
Netscape Enterprise Server. 
There are several key terms used with HTTP. The following are some of the 
terms used within this overview. 
1. Cache: A program's local store of response messages and the subsystem that 
controls its message storage, retrieval, and deletion. [Ref. 5] 
2. Client: An application program that establishes connections for the purpose of 
sending requests. [Ref. 5] 
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3. Connection: A transport layer virtual circuit established between two 
application programs for the purpose of communication. [Ref. 5] 
4. Entity: The information transferred as the payload of a request or a response. 
[Ref. 5] 
5. Message: The basic unit of HTTP communication, consisting of a structured 
sequence of octets transmitted via the connection. [Ref. 5] 
6. Object: A file, such as a HyperText Markup Language (HTML) file, a JPEG 
image, a GIF image, a Java applet, and/or an audio clip. [Ref. 2] 
7. Request: An HTTP request message. [Ref. 5] 
8. Resource: A network data object or service, which can be identified by a 
Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). [Ref. 5] 
9. Response: An HTTP response message. [Ref. 5] 
10. Server: An application program that accepts connections in order to service 
requests by sending back responses. [Ref. 5] 
11. URI: Uniform resource identifier. Formatted strings that identify, via name, 
location, or any other characteristic, a resource. [Ref. 5] (Defined in IETF 
RFC 2396 [Ref. 6].) 
12. URL: Uniform resource locator. Formatted strings that identify the location 
of an object. (Defined in IETF RFC 2396 [Ref. 6].) 
13. User Agent: The client that initiates a request. 
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HTTP was developed to help simplify the way users access information on the 
Internet. HTTP is generic in nature. It can be used to transfer ASCll text, hypertext, 
audio, images, and any other Internet accessible information or data. The information 
that can be transferred using HTTP is flexible, both in content and length. HTTP is a 
stateless protocol in that the server keeps no state information about the client's activities 
or requests. However there is an option, called "cookies" that can be used to allow the 
server to keep some information about the client and user. There are currently two 
versions of HTTP that most current servers and clients support simultaneously. HTTP 
1.0 was proposed in Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comment (RFC) 
1945 [Ref. 7] as an informational RFC. HTTP 1.1, currently the standard, was first 
proposed in IETF RFC 2068 [Ref. 8] and later clarified in IETF RFC 2616 [Ref. 5]. The 
IETF has several RFCs that are related to HTTP including RFC 2145 that discusses the 
use of the HTTP version numbers [Ref. 9] and RFC 2295 that discusses "Transparent 
Content Negotiation with HTTP 1.1" [Ref. 10]. Another HTTP related RFC is RFC 2617, 
"HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication" [Ref. 11]. This proposal 
improves on the security methods for authenticating users to a server and outlines 
methods for authenticating users to a server without sending passwords in clear text form 
(the method used in HTTP 1.0). 
HTTP 1.0 was simple in nature. The client initiated a TCP connection, the server 
accepted the connection, the client sent a request, the server serviced the request and then 
closed the connection. One major disadvantage to HTTP 1.0 was that, by default, the 
TCP connection was closed after each transfer of an object. A web page might be 
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compromised of several objects that include hypertext and images. HTTP 1.0 would 
require that a TCP connection be established for each object on the page. For example, if 
a page contained one hypertext file and six graphic images, seven separate TCP 
connections would need to be established. This connection establishment/teardown is 
very inefficient. It adds overhead traffic to the network, which contributes to network 
congestion. It is also slower because each connection requires the initial establishment. 
A partial remedy was proposed in an effort to overcome this limitation but was proven to 
be relatively ineffective. HTTP 1.0 was also found to have several bugs and 
shortcomings. These problems lead to the proposal of HTTP 1.1. 
HTTP 1.1 was first proposed in IETF RFC 2068 [Ref. 8] and clarified in IETF 
RFC 2616 [Ref. 5]. These RFCs attempt to make HTTP a well-behaved, well-defined, 
generic Internet protocol. The proposal clearly specifies that HTTP 1.1 must be 
compatible with HTTP 0.9 and HTTP 1.0. This backward compatibility allows for ease 
of migration and upgrading of client/server applications that were initially designed for 
HTTP 1.0. One area of improvement was the TCP connection state. HTTP 1.1 allows 
persistent TCP connections. This greatly improves the efficiency of the protocol. A 
connection may be used for one or more message/object exchanges. The 
requests/responses can be pipelined without waiting for each response to be serviced, so 
that a single TCP connection can be used more efficiently and with much lower elapsed 
time. These persistent connections also come with a drawback. The issue as to when to 
close the TCP connection must now be considered. Three methods have been specified. 
The client can explicitly request to close the connection using a Close connection header 
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field option within the message. The server can issue a Close connection response using 
a header field option informing the client that the connection will be closed. The server 
can time-out on an inactive connection and then close the connection. 
HTTP 1.1 provides for virtual hosts allowing service providers to assign multiple 
domain names to a single IP address. The server will be able to distinguish the pages 
from the domain name used in the URL. This is accomplished using the Host header 
field in the request message [Ref. 12]. This is a major change from HTTP 1.0 in that this 
Host header field must be present in the message so that the server can correctly service 
the request. 
HTTP 1.1 also improves the caching capabilities of clients and servers. It 
provides well-defined rules and a caching model, which allows both servers and clients to 
control the level of cachability and the conditions under which the cache should update its 
contents [Ref. 12]. 
There are two main types of HTTP messages that both HTTP 1.0 and HTTP 1.1 
support, the request message and the response message. The client usually sends the 
request message to the server. The server responds to a client's request with a response 
message. 
The first line of the request message is called the request line. It has three distinct 
fields: the method field, the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) field, and the HTTP 
version field. The method field is a key word that indicates to the server what action is 
being requested. The URL field gives information about the location of the object being 
requested. The version field is the version of HTTP the client is using [Ref. 2]. 
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Following the request line are header lines. Most header lines are optional. Some header 
lines provide information about the client and what type of information the client is 
capable of handling. These header lines help the server do its job better by allowing the 
server to send objects to the client that it can handle and interpret. One header line that 
must be present with HTTP version 1.1 is the Host header line. If the requested URI 
does not include an Internet host name for the service being requested, then the Host 
header field must be given with an empty value [Ref. 13]. This line specifies the host on 
which the object resides. It allows for virtual hosts (see preceding paragraphs for 
explanation). Following the request line and header lines, an empty line followed only by 
a carriage return, CR, and line feed, LF, is sent to indicate the end of the request message. 
Method I IURL I !Version ICR ILF 
header field name I: I value ICRILF 
. 
header field name _I: I value ICRjLF 
CR ILFI 
Figure 1 HTTP Request Message After Ref. [14] 
Method Definition Version 
GET Get a header and resource from the server 1.0 
HEAD Return just the header, no resource 1.0 
POST Send information to the server 1.0 
OPTIONS Return the list of methods allowed by the 
server 1.1 
TRACE Trace a request to see what the server sees 1.1 
DELETE Delete a resource on the server 1.1 
PUT Create or change a file on the server 1.1 
CONNECT Enables proxies to switch to a tunneling mode 
for protocols like SSL 1.1 
Table 1 HTTP Methods 
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The response message has three sections: a status line, header lines, and then the 
entity body. The first line of the response message is called the status line. It has three 
distinct fields: the protocol version field, a status code, and a corresponding status 
message. The version field is the version of HTTP the server is using. The status code 
and corresponding message indicate the result of the request from the client [Ref. 2]. 
Following the request line are header lines. Some header lines provide information about 
the server, connection information and general information. Other header lines will give 
information about the object being sent to the client such as the type of object being sent 
and the length of the object so that the client knows how to handle the object and how 
much data to expect. Following the status line and header lines, an empty line followed 
only by a carriage return, CR, and line feed, LF, is sent to indicate the beginning of the 
object. The object is then sent. 
Version I I Status Code I I Phrase I CR I LF 
header field name 1: lvalue ICRILF 
header field name J: lvalue ICRILF 
CR JLF I 
Entity Body 
Figure 2 HTTP Response Message After Ref. [14] 
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Code Range Meaning 
100-199 Informational 
200-299 Client request successful 
300-399 Client request redirected, further action necessary 
400-499 Client request incomplete 
500-599 Server errors 
Table2 HTTP Status Codes 
B. APACHE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION PRODUCT 
The Apache Software Foundation has information about its activities and products 
at its web site, www.apache.org [Ref. 2]. 
The Apache HTTP server project is a collaborative software development effort 
aimed at creating a robust commercial-grade, featureful, and freely available source code 
implementation of an HTTP (Web) server [Ref. 2]. 
The Apache software version 1.3.12 was downloaded from the Apache Software 
Foundation site. Included in this package is C language source code for the server 
application, Readme files, Makefiles, configuration files, HTML documentation for the 
server, example source code for creating and adding platform/application dependent 
modules and information to help port, configure, and manage an Apache-based server. 
The application has already been successfully ported to many different platforms and all 
of these ports are freely available. The openness of Apache's source code is one of the 
major reasons for its popularity [Ref. 15]. 
The Apache software is covered by a license allowing its distribution (see 
Appendix B). The Apache Software Foundation provides no formal support for the 
Apache server software. The information available in their documentation as well as on 
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their web site [Ref. 2] is useful. In addition, there are also several web sites dedicated to 
the support of sites with Apache-based servers. There are numerous reference books 
available that provide varying levels of detail of information on Apache. The range of 
topics for reference books include configuration, maintenance, and optimization of 
Apache, to adding custom built modules, to securing an Apache-based server. 
Apache is designed to work on a network. On a Unix platform, it can be activated 
as a daemon, running in the background waiting for a client application to request service 
[Ref. 15]. It can also be activated through an application that services network 
connections. 
Apache is setup through configuration files. These files contain Apache directives 
that control the server's behavior. Using the configuration file makes Apache extremely 
versatile and gives the administrator comprehensive control over the features and security 
provided by Apache [Ref. 15]. 
The Apache Software Foundation package provides many additional modules that 
administrators can configure into the server to meet their needs. To add a module to an 
Apache-based server, the module must be compiled and built with the server. It must then 
be configured with the correct directives in the server configuration file. The ease of 
adding and configuring add-on modules allows administrators to fine-tune an Apache-
based server and only configure the modules they require. There is also a large amount of 
third party modules available for Apache servers that can provide more capabilities and 
flexibility [Ref. 15]. A list of the modules provided with the Apache source code 
package is presented in Appendix I. 
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It is this flexibility, coupled with Apache's stability and performance, and the 
availability of its source code that makes it the most popular choice of web server 
software on the Internet [Ref. 15]. 
C. XTS-300 PLATFORM 
The XTS-300 product is a combination of STOP 4.4.2, a multilevel secure 
operating system, and a Wang Government Services Inc. supplied x86 hardware base 
[Ref. 16]. The current hardware platform is Pentium-based. STOP is a Unix-like 
multiprogramming operating system designed not only to support much of the Unix 
System V interface for applications software but to produce and run object programs that 
adhere to a subset of the "Intel 386 Family Binary Compatibility Specification 2" as well 
[Ref. 16]. 
The XTS-300 provides network connectivity in the evaluated configuration, 
through TCP/IP and single level Ethernet built into the Trusted Computing Base (TCB). 
However, it does not provide network application servers [Ref. 16]. 
The XTS-300 provides Mandatory Access Control (MAC) that allows for 
enforcement of both a security and an integrity policy. Enforcement of the mandatory 
confidentiality policy is based on a mechanism that meets the requirements formally 
expressed in the Bell and LaPadula security model [Ref. 17]. Mandatory integrity policy 
enforcement is based on a mechanism that adheres to the Biba integrity policy model 
[Ref. 18]. The system implements Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and provides for 
user identification and authentication needed for user ID-based policy enforcement [Ref. 
16]. 
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hnplementation of a Secure Attention Key (SAK) provides a trusted path 
mechanism. The system enforces the "principle of least privilege", giving users no more 
authorization than that required to perform their functions [Ref. 16]. The TCB makes use 
of hardware features to provide process separation and TCB isolation. The TCB has been 
designed and implemented to resist penetration [Ref. 16]. 
The XTS-300, STOP 4.4.2, was evaluated against the Department of Defense 
(DoD) TCSEC [Ref. 19] and rated at level Class B3. This Class B3 rating implies not 
only incorporation of particular security features but also a high level of assurance [Ref. 
16]. 
D. NPS MULTILEVEL SECURE LOCAL AREA NETWORK PROJECT 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Multilevel Secure (MLS) Local Area 
Network (LAN) project's goal is to provide true multilevel access to information over a 
LAN [Ref. 20]. This is an ongoing project at the NPS Center for INFOSEC Studies and 
Research Department. 
There are three main components that comprise the MLS LAN: a high assurance 
multilevel secure server, a Trusted Computing Base Extension (TCBE) with a Trusted 
Application Protocol Server (TPS), and a Secure Session Server that resides on the high 
assurance server. 
The first component is the high assurance multilevel secure server platform. The 
server must be equipped with a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) which provides a 
penetration resistant security enforcement mechanism for the MLS LAN operations [Ref. 
20] [Ref. 21] [Ref. 22]. The TCB will provide the mandatory and discretionary access 
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controls to information as well as user identification, authentication, and authorization 
services [Ref. 21] [Ref. 22]. The Wang XTS-300 acts as the high assurance server in the 
MLS LAN. It is equipped with a TCB that enforces the security policies on the protocol 
application servers. 
The second component in the MLS LAN is the Trusted Computing Base 
Extension (TCBE) [Ref. 23]. The TCBE has three main functions: establish a trusted path 
between the user and the high assurance workstation, enforce the object reuse provision 
of the TCB, and enforce access control policies [Ref. 22]. The TCBE is required because 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) workstations running COTS operating systems and 
applications are not trusted or trustworthy. The COTS workstations are equipped with a 
TCBE that will provide a trusted path to the high assurance server. The client workstation 
used in the MLS LAN is a Pentium-based personal computer (PC) running Microsoft 
Windows NT. 
The TCBE in place for this implementation was software driven. A software 
application was provided that allowed the user to establish a trusted path with the high 
assurance server. A trusted software application, the Trusted Path Server (TPS) 
(sometimes referred to as the TCBE server) is used to communicate with the client and 
provide the trusted path [Ref. 24]. This communication connection is made over Ethernet. 
The TPS is responsible for accepting user logins and session level negotiations for the 
client workstations. It is also responsible for associating a usemame and session level 
with each login from the client workstation. 
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The third component of the MLS LAN is a software program called Secure 
Session Server (SSS) [Ref. 24]. This is a trusted application on the high assurance server 
that acts much like the Unix "inetd" daemon. It accepts protocol requests on various port 
numbers and creates a process to handle the communication with the client. For each 
accepted protocol request, the SSS receives the user ID and session level, provided 
through the TPS, associated with the client workstation. The SSS uses this information to 
create the protocol server to handle the client's request. The server executes as the user ID 
and at the session level of that user. The data is passed back and forth from the client to 
the protocol server via the SSS. 
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Figure 3 MLS LAN Configuration After Ref. [22] 
The protocol server and the Secure Session Server communicate through a 
"pseudo socket". The pseudo socket can be described as the communication medium, or a 
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virtual socket, or the read/write buffer between the two processes. Its only function is to 
pass data between the two processes. 
The two figures below represent a basic LAN Architecture and a MLS LAN 
Architecture. A basic LAN has no trusted components and cannot provide high assurance 
access control to multilevel information. This information is vulnerable to attacks and 






Basic LAN Architecture 
With a MLS LAN Architecture, there are trusted and high assurance components 
that provide access control and protection to the multilevel information. The trusted 
architecture includes the high assurance host and clients enhanced with the TCBEs. In the 
MLS LAN, once a client-server connection is established (a trusted path), other clients 
(trusted or not) cannot penetrate the trusted connection. Information cannot be attacked or 
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disclosed through the trusted path and the high assurance server enforces access control 
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Basic MLS LAN Architecture After Ref. [23] 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE APACHE SOFTWARE PACKAGE 
A. IMPLEMENTATION REQUIREMENTS 
This Apache-based server was implemented to function in a MLS LAN 
environment. A MLS LAN server application implemented on the XTS-300 is accessed 
through a Trusted Computing Base Extension, TCBE. The XTS-300 MLS LAN 
applications are the Trusted Path Server, TPS, and Secure Session Server, SSS. The XTS-
300 would do all authentication of the user and session level. If a request for an HTTP 
service comes through the TCB tunnel, the SSS would activate the HTTP server 
application. All information passed between the client and server would pass through this 
protected trusted path. The communication between the server and the client would be 
accomplished through "pseudo sockets" rather than network sockets. The pseudo socket 
will be the communication path between the server application and the SSS. This pseudo 
socket communication imposed several requirements and restrictions on the HTTP server. 
1. The server must be activated by another application namely the Secure 
Session Server (SSS). 
2. The server must be stand-alone; it should not spawn or create children or 
additional processes. 
3. The implementation calls for no parameters or arguments to be passed to the 
server application. 
4. The server must communicate (both read and write) to the Secure Session 
Server through the pseudo sockets rather than network sockets. 
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5. The Secure Session Server must be configured to recognize and correctly 
respond to HTTP client requests. 
6. The server must not adversely affect the evaluation rating of the system. 
7. The server should be permitted read-down privileges, allowing users at a 
higher level read access to lower level objects. 
8. The server should not be permitted read-up privileges, not allowing users at a 
lower level read access to higher level objects. 
The rest of this chapter addresses these requirements and concludes with a section 
on the difficulties and problems encountered during the porting of the Apache-based 
server and what solutions were attempted to solve these problems. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION DECISIONS 
1. The server must be activated by another application namely the Secure 
Session Server (SSS). 
This requirement was accomplished through modification of the server 
configuration file. One of the Apache directives is ServerType. The directive controls the 
way in which Apache handles multiple copies of itself as well as how Apache is 
activated. The arguments are inetd or standalone (default value). By using inetd, the 
server knows that it has been activated by another process. On a Unix platform, the inetd 
daemon receives requests for network applications through port numbers. The inetd 
daemon will then activate the corresponding server and hand off the connection to the 
server to allow it to service the request. 
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2. The server must be stand-alone; it should not spawn or create children or 
additional processes. 
This requirement was accomplished through the ServerType directive. By setting 
the value to inetd, another process servicing network connections (on a Unix platform this 
is the inetd daemon) is responsible for activating individual servers each time an HTTP 
request comes in. The server will exit once it has finished servicing the request. The inetd 
option will be used on the XTS-300 platform to allow the SSS to activate one server at a 
time. The Apache Group has declared this method of activation as clumsy and inefficient 
[Ref. 25]. The Apache server was designed to be a server daemon that runs all the time 
and handles the network connections itself. The basic concept of the Apache server is that 
the server has several child servers. The parent server waits for a request and then hands 
the request off to a child or spawns another child to handle the request, allowing the 
parent to service another request. This method is fast; the parent quickly services the 
request by passing it to a child and is ready for the next request to come it. It also uses 
memory efficiently since the server configuration file is read at initial activation and the 
parameters are cached in the parent server's memory where they can be shared with all 
the children. By using the inetd option, each client request activates a new server 
specifically for that client. This results in a slower response time since the server must 
read the server configuration file and open any log files before it is ready to service the 
request. Because it cannot share memory with other servers, memory is used inefficiently. 
The multilevel secure environment will take full advantage of these two 
conditions resulting from using the inetd option. The memory of a server running at one 
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classification level can not be shared with a server running at a different classification 
level. All log files must also be kept at different levels, thus preventing write-down. The 
inetd option supports these restrictions. Without the inetd option, the child servers are 
trusted with respect to MAC policies and untrusted with respect to DAC policies. This is 
unaccepted. The servers should be untrusted in both areas to allow the TCB to enforce the 
access control policies. The inetd option allows all application servers, activated as 
children of the Secure Session Server, to be untrusted with respect to MAC and DAC 
policies. 
3. The implementation calls for no parameters or arguments to be passed to the 
server. 
This was a problem since the server needs to know where to find the main 
configuration file. This path information is usually passed as an argument to the process. 
If using the inetd option and the inetd daemon on a Unix platform, you can specify 
options and arguments to pass to the application in the inetd.conf file. The SSS does not 
have this capability. The solution was to hardcode the configuration file path name in a 
configuration header file that is included with the Apache source code. The ap_config.h 
header file allows numerous platform-dependent parameter and variable definitions. This 
header file is to be modified based on the platform that Apache will be built on. The 
following line was added under the "XTS" block of definitions 
#define SERVER_CONFIG_Fll.£ /usr2/bersack/http/conf/httpd.conf 
This definition is intended to be used as a constant. Once the configuration file is 
in place it should not be renamed or moved. The renaming or moving of the configuration 
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file will require a complete recompilation of the server. This definition could and should 
be removed once the Secure Session Server is configured to pass arguments to server 
applications, acting like the Unix inetd daemon. 
4. The server must be able to communicate (both read and write) to the Secure 
Session Server through the pseudo sockets rather than network sockets. 
This involved searching through the Apache C language source code to isolate the 
system-level calls that wrote to and read from the network sockets. Once these calls were 
identified, they were modified to call functions that communicate with the pseudo socket 
instead. These pseudo socket functions had been written and implemented in other 
network applications ported to this platform. Also, the network socket setup code had to 
be isolated and modified so that a network socket was not opened for communication, but 
redirected to communicate with the pseudo socket. To minimize changes to the Apache 
source code, the network socket structure was filled with data for the pseudo socket. This 
eliminated the need to find all references to the network socket variable and change it to 
the pseudo socket variable. 
format: 
5. The Secure Session Server must be configured to recognize and correctly 
respond to HTTP client requests. 
The Secure Session Server (SSS) reads a configuration file that has the following 
Protocol ID Port # APS Path 
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The Protocol ID represents the protocol name, for HTTP it would be HTTP. The 
Port # is the network port number that the daemon should listen to for HTTP traffic. The 
default port number for HTTP is 80. This is a well-known port number and used by all 
commercially available web browsers. The APS Path is the full pathname for the 
application program server (APS). For this version of the Apache-based server the full 
pathname is /usr2/bersack/apache13/src/httpd. By adding the following line to the SSS 
configuration file, the SSS will be able to activate the server for any HTTP requests 
arriving on port 80. 
HTTP 80 /usr2/bersack/apache 13/src/httpd 
This line must be changed and/or modified if the server application is moved or 
renamed or if the port number the server can service changes. 
6. The server must not adversely affect the evaluation rating of the system. 
The Apache-based HTTP server runs on the XTS-300. It communicates through 
the Secure Session Server (SSS). It is an untrusted application and does not enforce a 
security policy. It does not add to the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) on the XTS. For 
this reason, the software package should have no effect on the evaluation rating of the 
system. There are basic security issues concerning any Apache-based server hosted on 
any platform that must be addressed. These issues are discussed in the Apache 
documentation. Some security issues related to an Apache-based server in a MLS LAN 
environment are discussed in Chapter V. 
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7. The server should be pennitted read-down privileges, allowing users at a 
higher level read access to lower level objects. 
The server does not enforce this policy. The XTS-300 will enforce the access 
control policies. The server is activated at the session level the user is running at, with the 
permissions allowed for that user. The XTS-300 enforces the access control policies 
pertaining to the user ID and current session level. The Apache-based server will be 
constrained by the TCB. This will be true for objects embedded in a web page that the 
server tries to access as well as for the web page itself. If the object is at a lower level, the 
server will have access to the lower level objects but not to higher level objects. If the 
XTS-300 allows the server access to an object, the server will send that object to the 
client. If the XTS-300 does not allow the server access to an object, the server will not be 
able to serve the object to the client and will send an error message instead. 
8. The server should not be pennitted read-up privileges, not allowing users at a 
lower level read access to higher level objects. 
The discussion for requirement 7 above applies to this requirement also. 
C. PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES 
Several problems were encountered during this porting project. The first problem 
was encountered after the Apache-provided files were installed on the XTS-300. All of 
the text files had extra control characters at the end of each line. A generic shell script 
was written that would remove these control characters from the files and save the fixed 
file. This later led to problems with the image files that came as part of the Apache 
software package. All of the control characters were removed from these image files. This 
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corrupted the files. The client could not display the image, since it was corrupt. Once this 
problem was isolated, all of the image files were replaced and the client was able to 
correctly display them. 
The next problem was to determine all of the various parameters and definitions 
to set in the configuration header file, ap_config.h, for the XTS-300 platform. A majority 
of the C language #define statements in the configuration header file are used to define or 
undefine system calls and functions specific to a particular target platform. The Apache 
documentation on porting defines a few of these parameters, but there are many others 
that were discovered as the porting progressed. A few of the parameters were incorrectly 
defined or used with default values. These caused numerous problems during the testing 
stage. The full list of parameters and variables that were set and used for the XTS-300 
platform are discussed in the next chapter and provided in Appendix F. 
The XTS-300 platform has very primitive debugging capabilities. Debugging was 
accomplished by adding print statements to the source code. This in itself caused several 
problems that included debug file creation, file access, and writing to the file. 
A problem arose while testing the initial build of the server. An attempt was made 
to use a Telnet session on the local host machine to communicate with the server. This 
was tested before any pseudo socket code had been added and with minimal changes to 
the base Apache source code. Had the server been configured correctly, it should have 
sent a response message to the request message sent using the Telnet session. The Telnet 
session seemed to talk to the server and produce output to the error log file when errors 
were detected on the server side. However, the Telnet session did not produce the 
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expected response output to the window the Telnet session was running in. It was 
determined that the Telnet session was not echoing the characters from the response 
message to the window. To remedy this problem, a terminal echo program was used 
instead of the Telnet session. This program did provide the expected response headers 
and messages and indicated that the server was responding and working correctly. 
Several other minor problems were encountered during the project. They are 
discussed in the next chapter, as they arose during the testing of the server. 
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF AN APACHE-BASED HTTP WEB 
SERVER ON THE XTS-300 COMPUTER 
All modifications, additions, and changes made for this Apache-based 
implementation are presented in this chapter. It first describes the directory structure 
organization of the Apache files residing on the XTS-300 platform. It highlights the 
changes made to the configuration files that were used to create the Makefiles for the C 
language source code compilation. The parameters used in the platform-dependent 
configuration C language header file are described. It discusses the major changes to the 
C language source code to enable the server to run in a MLS LAN environment. The 
phases used to implement the Apache-based server are outlined. 
The Apache-based web server was implemented in phases. The first phase 
concentrated on getting the server compiled with minimal changes to the base Apache C 
language source code. Once the server was compiled, the server was tested on the local 
host to ensure it was functioning as expected. 
The next phase was to modify the C language source code to allow the server to 
communicate through pseudo sockets rather than network sockets. Once these 
modifications were finished, the server was tested in a client/server environment in the 
MLS LAN to isolate and correct problems. 
The final phase was to test the server at different session levels, with different 
clients, and with different user personas. Problems arose during this phase that required 
modifications to the server configuration file. 
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We begin with a description of the Apache source directories and Makefiles. 
A. APACHE SOURCE DIRECTORY STRUCTURE 
The Apache-provided files were organized in a hierarchical tree directory 
structure. The top-level directory contains files describing basic Apache information, 
installation guidance, licensing agreement, and PGP keys for the Apache developers. It 
has five subdirectories: cgi-bin, conf, htdocs, icons, and src. 
The cgi-bin directory contains sample test cgi-scripts to use if the mod_cgi 
module is used. 
The conf directory contains sample server configuration files that should be 
modified for the target platform. 
The htdocs directory contains HTML pages about the Apache server. The Apache 
manual is under this directory and contains valuable information to help implement and 
configure an Apache-based server. The manual documents are the same documents found 
at the Apache web site [Ref. 2]. 
The icons directory contains image files used with the Apache HTML 
documentation and manual. 
The src directory contains all the files needed to compile and link the Apache 
server. It contains porting instructions, installation and configuration scripts, template 
Makefile, and general Readme instruction files. The top-level Makefile resides in this src 
directory. There are several subdirectories under the src directory that contain the C 
language source code and header files for the Apache server. These subdirectories are ap, 
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helpers, include, lib, main, modules, os, regex, and support. Each of these subdirectories 
contain a Makefile that is used to compile the source code in the directory. 
The src/ap directory contains source code files that have various Apache system 
defined functions that can be used if the target platform does not support a particular 
function. 
The src/helpers directory contains various scripts that are executed when the top-
level Configure script is executed. These scripts help determine the operating system of 
the target platform and various characteristics of that operating system. 
The src/include directory contains all of the Apache-provided C language header 
files required for the compilation of the Apache server. 
The srcllib directory contains a subdirectory, expat-lite that provides source code 
used to parse XML files. 
The src/main directory contains the core C language source code for the Apache 
server. Most of the modifications made for this implementation were to C language 
source code files in this directory. 
The src/modules directory contains subdirectories of source code for Apache-
provided add-on modules. These subdirectories are example, experimental, extra, proxy, 
and standard. The example directory contains example modules to help programmers 
with the Apache API and module concept. The experimental directory contains work-in-
progress modules. The extra directory is provided to hold third-party modules. The proxy 
directory contains the C language source code for the Apache proxy module. The 
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standard directory contains the C language source code for the standard Apache-provided 
modules. 
The src/os directory contains subdirectories that have C language source code 
related to a specific operating system. These subdirectories are bs2000, mpeix, netware, 
os, os390, tpf, unix, and win32. The src/os!unix directory was used in this implementation 
for the XTS-300 platform. 
The src/regex directory provides C language source code to parse regular 
expressions (wildcards, ranges, the Unix -) used in directives in the server configuration 
file. 
The src!support directory contains example files and scripts that provide support 
for operating system functions such as log rotation and starting/stopping the server. 
A complete listing of all files under the top-level directory is provided in 
Appendix C. 
B. MAKEFILE MODIFICATIONS 
The Unix "make" program is a software engineering tool. It aids in the 
development of large programs by keeping track of which portions of the entire program 
have been changed, compiling only those parts that have changed since the last compile. 
The make program relies on a file that provides rules and instructions for it to execute. 
The default filename for the make file is Makefile. Apache uses this default convention. 
The Apache-provided Configure script dynamically builds all of the Makefiles 
using the options and parameters defined for the platform in the Configure file. The top 
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level Makefile and all lower level Makefiles are created this way even though template 
Makefiles are supplied with the source code. The Apache documentation recommends 
modification of the Configure script, rather than manual modification of Makefiles. This 
is suggested since there are several Makefiles created for the subdirectories when the 
Configure script is executed and using the Configure script ensures that all the Makefiles 
have the updated parameters needed for the specific target platform. The top-level 
Makefile has calls to lower level Makefiles that are needed to build the Apache-based 
server. A complete listing of the top-level Makefile is provided in Appendix G. 
C. PHASEONE 
This phase concentrated on compiling, linking, and testing the server on the XTS-
300 platform. The main goal was to get the Apache source compiled and linked, with as 
few modifications as necessary, so that it could be executed on the XTS-300 platform. 
The initial step in this phase was to determine the version of Apache source code 
to implement. This step involved downloading a version, loading it onto the XTS-300, 
compiling and linking it, and ensuring that the required tools to support the configuration 
of the Apache server were available on the XTS-300 platform. 
When this project was first undertaken, the Apache Software Foundation had just 
released Apache version 2.03a. This version was downloaded from the Apache Software 
Foundation web site and installed on the XTS-300 computer. The documentation for this 
version stated that two configuration management tools were needed in support of 
building the Apache server. These were "libtool 1.3" and "autoconf 2.13". Each had to be 
built and installed on the platform that Apache was to be built on. These two applications 
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are freely available GNU software applications. They were downloaded from the GNU 
web site [Ref. 26] and installed on the XTS-300. After some modifications to their 
Makefiles (needed for the XTS-300 platform), they were both compiled and linked. 
At this point, the first attempt to build Apache was attempted. However, the 
Apache configuration file did not seem to recognize the presence of libtool and autoconf. 
The Apache documentation was unclear as to where these two tools had to reside in 
relation to the source code and configuration file; i.e. in the same directory as the 
configuration file, in a bin directory, or as a user-specified full path name within the 
server directory structure. Several configuration attempts were tried, but the Apache 
configuration script was still unable to recognize that these applications were present on 
the system. Rather than play a potentially endless guessing game, an alternative was 
chosen. 
Documentation for Apache 1.3.12 contains no references to autoconfig or libtool, 
so it was decided to try this version of the software. This decision had several additional 
advantages. At the time of this port, the 1.3 .12 version was the latest stable version of 
Apache. The 2.0* versions were being updated almost monthly on the web site with bug 
fixes and enhancements. Most of the known bugs in the 1.3.12 version are documented 
and fixes are available. Also the 1.3.12 package includes template Makefiles that do not 
rely on autoconfig or libtool. The project could concentrate on the Apache server rather 
than on tools that the server depended on to be built. 
The second step was to use the Apache provided Configure script to create the 
platform dependent Makefiles. This script called several other provided scripts. One script 
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checked for location and presence of C language header files on the target system so that 
the include statements could be generated in the dynamically created ap_config_auto.h 
file. 
The first script the Configure script called was the GuessOS script to determine 
the operating system to configure for. The GuessOS script used the Unix "uname" 
command with different options to try to determine the platform, operating system, and 
operating system version number if applicable. Once this information is determined, the 
script sets default parameters that the Configure script would use to generate the 
Makefiles. The GuessOS script could not interpret the XTS-300 STOP operating system 
because it was not a predefined case in the script. To remedy this situation, the following 
modifications were added to the GuessOS file: 
############################## 
# 




echo "${SYSTEM}-xts300-stop4.4"; exit 0 
############################## 
The "SYSTEM" variable is the host name. The line returned from this script for 
this implementation is holmes-xts300-stop4.4. 
Once the GuessOS script was modified to recognize the XTS-300 STOP operating 
system and return this information to the Configure script, the Configure script had to be 
modified to use the returned information correctly. The Configure script has many case 
statements that switch on the parameters returned from the GuessOS script. These case 
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statements are used to define and set parameters used in the Makefiles. All of the 
Makefiles are generated using this Configure script. The following lines were initially 
added to the Configure script file: 
########################## 
# 




OS= 1 XTS 1 
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -g -DXTS -
I/usr2/shifflet/wip/include " 
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -lcass -lmw -lsocket -lgen" 
LIBS="$LIBS -L/lib -lsocket -lmw -lgen -





The "OS" variable defines the platform the server was built for. The "CFLAGS" 
are used as compile options and defines the parameter "XTS". This parameter was used to 
isolate added code in the C language source files and headers to distinguish that the code 
was added for this implementation. The other variables are basic C language Makefile 
parameters used to define specific pathnames and options to use for this platform. 
The Configure script also uses the Configuration file to control which add-on 
modules should be included and compiled. Execution of the Configure script generates a 
generic C language source code file called modules.c. The Configuration file contains 
directives for which add-on modules to compile with the Apache server. Modules are 
included for compilation by uncommenting the appropriate line corresponding to the 
module in the Configuration file. The format of the line is an "AddModule" directive 
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followed by the path/mod_name of object code of the module. The Configure script 
would then try to match the mod_name to a C language source file in the directory 
specified by path. If the Configure script could not find a matching C language source 
file, it would look at the module definitions within the C language source files in the 
directory to try to find a match. The Configure script only inspected the first word of the 
module definition. Some module definitions had two or three word definitions. When 
none of the first-word definitions matched the parameter the Configure script was 
searching for, the Configure script assumed that the add-on module could not be found. 
This produced an error message when the Configure script was executed. By changing the 
Configure script to inspect the entire first line in the module definitions, the parameter 
could be matched and no error messages were generated. Two lines were modified in the 
Configure script to look at the entire first line of a module. The modified lines with 
changes in bold are: 
if ls -lt $file Configuration.tmpl I line I \ 
modname='egrep 'Amodule .*;' $modbase.c I line I\ 
Once these changes were complete, the Configure script could be executed. It 
produced the top-level Makefile as well as all subdirectory Makefiles. 
The next step was to attempt to compile the unmodified source code. The 
compilation depends upon the C language ap_config.h header file that is used to define 
platform specific calls, functions, definitions, and parameters. It is also used to undefine 
default values predefined for all platforms. Compilation errors were expected on this first 
attempt since nothing had been added to this header file for the XTS platform. These 
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errors helped define the platform-dependent parameters and variables required in the C 
language header file ap_config.h. The error messages also indicated functions that could 
not be found in the system C language libraries and inconsistencies with variables defined 
in the system C language header files. After a lot of investigation into the Apache 
documentation, the XTS-300 programming manual, and documentation on other projects 
that ported applications to the XTS-300, the following list of parameters were added to 
the ap_config.h file to specify the "XTS" definitions (A complete final version of all 
modifications is provided in Appendix F.) : 
!************************* 
* 


















#define NEED_INITGROUPS /* 
#undef HAVE_MMAP /* 
#define HAVE_SHMGET /* 
#undef HAVE_GMTOFF /* 






need groups */ 
do not have mmap{) */ 
do support shrnget() */ 
no gmtoffset function */ 
no crypt.h header file */ 
!* no sys/resource.h header 
!* do not use mmap */ 
!* do not use shrnget 
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#define USE_LONGJMP I* use the long jump functions *I 
#define USE_FCNTL_SERIALIZED_ACCEPT I* use this option for 
fcntl () *I 
#define NO_MMAP I* do not mmap() *I 
#define NO_KILLPG I* do not have killpg () *I 
#define NO_SETSID I* do not have setsid () *I 
#define NO_USE_SIGACTION I* do not use sigaction () *I 
#define NO_LINGCLOSE I* do not allow linger close of 
connections *I 
#define NO_GETTIMEOFDAY I* system gettirneofday only wants 
one parameter *I 
#define NEED_DIFFTIME 
#define S_ISLNK(rnode) 0 I* no symbolic links set to 0 
(false) *I 
typedef int pid_t; 
#define lstat stat I* redefine lstat to stat *I 
#define STDIN_FILENO 0 
#define STDOUT_FILENO 1 
#define STDERR_FILENO 2 
#define SIGCHLD SIGCLD I* redefine SIGCHLD to SIGCHD *I 
The #include statements define XTS system C language header files to be 
included in files when compiled. The parameter "pid_t" had to be type-cast as an integer. 
This variable, which describes a process ID on Unix platform, was not defined in any of 
the XTS system header files so it had to be created. The other #define and #undef 
statements are used to indicate if certain functions are available on the underlying 
platform or if the server should use functions that are provided as part of the Apache 
server source code package. The Apache documentation explains many of these #define 
parameters and suggests default values for them. Determination of which parameters that 
were ultimately defined or undefined resulted from searching the XTS-300 programming 
manual to see if the function was supported by the XTS-300. 
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Once the ap_eonfig.h file was modified another compilation was attempted. There 
were far fewer errors this time. The compiler complained about a getpass() function in the 
ap_getpass.e file. The function was not properly defined for the XTS platform. A return 
data type was not correctly typecast for the XTS system getpass() function. The following 
changes in bold were made to the ap_getpass() function in ap_getpass.e: 
#if defined (XTS) 
(int) pw_got = getpass(prompt); 
#else 
pw_got = getpass(prompt); 
#endif 
Another similar complaint was reported with an initgroup() function in util.e file. 
The XTS does not support this supplemental group function. The function had a 
provision for platforms that do not support this option so the flag was set for the XTS. 
The following change in bold was made to the initgroup() function in util.e: 
#if defined(QNX) II defined(MPE) 
defined(TPF) II defined(_TANDEM) II 
defined(XTS) 
I I defined (BEOS) II 
defined(NETWARE) I I 
Another modification was associated with the JentZ() system call. The XTS system 
function JentZ() expected a different data type of parameter passed to it than what was 
being used in the Apache source code. Two lines were modified in the http_main.e file: 
while ((ret= fcntl(lock_fd, F_SETLKW, (int)&lock_it)) < 0 
&& errno == EINTR) { 
while ((ret= fcntl(lock_fd, F_SETLKW, (int)&unlock_it)) < 0 
&& errno == EINTR) { 
After all of these modifications, the server was compiled and an executable was 
created. 
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The server was then tested in a standalone mode. When the server executes, it 
reads a server configuration file called httpd.conf whose pathname is passed as an 
argument to the program. The server configuration file required several changes to define 
attributes specific to the XTS and server directories. The following changes were made to 
the server configuration file httpd.conf (A complete listing of the httpd.conf file is 











The server was now activated as a standalone ServerType listening for traffic to 
arrive on port 2000. To communicate with the server, a Telnet session on the local host 
was attempted. The problem with this approach was discussed in the Chapter Ill-C. A 
terminal echo program was used instead. This program allowed the user to specify the 
port to communicate on and the message to send. Several lines could be sent to the server 
before sending the termination sequence: an empty line followed by a CR and LF. The 
server responded to each request. If the URL was not correct, an error message was 
logged to the error file and an error response message was sent. If the server could service 
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the request, the object was sent to the terminal echo program and displayed. These 
experiments showed that the server was working correctly. 
D. PHASETWO 
This phase concentrated on making the server communicate through pseudo 
sockets, as described in Chapter II-D, rather than network sockets. This involved 
modifications to source code, the ap_config.h header file, the Configure script, and the 
server configuration file httpd.conf 
The first step of this phase was to identify and isolate the Apache system read and 
write calls that communicated with the network sockets. This proved to be very 
challenging. Several debug statements were added to various functions to help track the 
flow of the source code. Two functions were finally found in the buff.c source file called 
ap_read() and ap_write(). The comments for these functions claimed they were the 
lowest level read and write functions, calling the XTS system read() and system write() 
functions. The ap_read() and ap_write() functions were modified to use macro 
definitions in place of calls to the system read() and write() functions. The macro 
definitions are defined in the ap_config.h header file. If the functions were compiled with 
the "USE_P _SOCKET" (this definition was added to the Configure script to be added to 
all of the Makefiles), the macro definitions would reference the pseudo socket functions. 
If this option was not defined for the compilation, the macro definitions would reference 
the system-defined functions. This allowed the server to be compiled to use a pseudo 
socket or a network socket. The only modification required for this switch is the inclusion 
or absence of the definition of the "USE_P _SOCKET" parameter in the Makefiles. 
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The macro definitions were added to the ap_config.h header file. A full listing of the 
additions to the ap_conjig.h header file is provided in Appendix F. 
The file http _main. c source file was modified to add the pseudo socket code. It 
was also modified to create and open a debug file that was used to help track down 
problems. 
The final modification to be made in the http_main.c source code file was ensure 
the variable used for communication to the network socket referenced the information for 
the pseudo socket. This centralized the code and was more efficient than tracking down 
all references to the network socket variable and changing it to reference a pseudo socket 
variable. A complete listing of modifications in http_main.c is provided in Appendix E. 
After all modifications and additions were complete, old compiled object code, 
libraries, and the executable file were removed from the system using the "clean" option 
in the Makefile. This was done to ensure a complete recompiling and linking of all source 
code. The server was compiled and linked and an executable file was created. 
The server configuration file was modified so that the ServerType was set to inetd. 
Also the Trusted Path Server configuration file was modified so that it would activate the 
HTTP server. 
E. PHASE THREE 
The third phase of the server port was the testing phase. 
Testing the server uncovered operational problems. The first major concern was 
whether the server was correctly and completely transmitting large files. The small files 
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would be completely transferred but large files would not. The buffer size for the Secure 
Session Server (SSS) communication was set to transfer data in chunks of 4096 bytes but 
did not keep track of how much data had been sent. Since the objects the server could 
send were of various size, the server needed to keep track of how much data it had sent to 
the SSS and how much it had left to send. The read/write functions that communicated 
with the SSS in http_main.c were modified to keep track of the amount of data sent and 
the amount of data waiting to be sent. 
Even after this modification, all data in the files was not sent completely. Debug 
statements were added to the source code to follow the flow of the program. The problem 
was tracked to an Apache function that called a platform-dependent system function 
called writev(). The XTS-300 does not support this function. After some research into the 
Apache documentation, a #define parameter called "NO_ WRITEV" was discovered. This 
parameter needs to be defined if a platform does not support the writev() function. This 
definition was added to the ap_config.h file and the server was recompiled. The server 
now served the pages completely. 
Another problem encountered was with image files. The first inclination was to 
blame the image problem on the writev() problem, but once this was corrected the image 
files were still not correctly displayed by the client. After much debugging and searching 
through Apache handlers and C language source code, the image files on the XTS-300 
were determined to be corrupt (see previous chapter). Once new images files were loaded 
onto the XTS-300, they were transferred and displayed by the client. The only 
modification needed for this problem was good image files. 
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The hardest and most challenging problem was related to the debug file creation. 
At times the server would be activated, create the debug file without writing to it, and exit 
without servicing the client request. Other times, if the debug file existed, the server 
would work properly. Even when the file was created a priori, successful service was hit 
and miss. Sometimes the server would service the request and other times it would just 
exit. This problem was very frustrating because no errors were being written to the error 
log and the information in the debug file gave no clues as to what the problem could be. 
The debug log would show that the server would get the request but never respond to it. 
After a lot of trial and error, and frustration, the problem was finally isolated to a timing 
problem. The SSS was activating the server and immediately signaling that it had data for 
the server to read. Sometimes the server was not ready to handle this signal and would 
just exit when the signal occurred. Other times it would service the signal but not have 
time to respond. To solve the problem, the SSS was modified so that it activated the 
server and then waited for the server response that it was ready for data. The code in 
http_main.c was modified so that it had time to create and open the debug file, setup the 
pseudo socket and then respond that it was ready for data. This solved the hit and miss 
service problem as well as the file creation problem. 
The same type of behavior was occurring on the close of the connection. The SSS 
would close its communication connection with the server before the server could issue 
the close-connection response. This resulted in the client waiting for more data to be 
transferred from the server. The client had no indication that the data transfer was 
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complete. This was solved by having the SSS inform the client that the connection was to 
be closed. 
The server now seemed to be working correctly in the MLS LAN environment. 
F. PHASE FOUR 
The final phase was to try the server at different session levels. The first attempt 
to request that the server serve a page at a high classification level resulted in no service. 
The error log file could not be created at this level in the current directory it was directed 
to write to. As a solution, the server configuration file, httpd.conf, was modified to place 
all server write-able files in the /tmp directory on the XTS-300. This directory exists at all 
levels. Once this change was made, the server worked at all levels and with different user 
personas. 
The mod_include module was added to the server and configured in the server 
configuration file to attempt to have the server serve a dynamic web page comprised of 
objects at different levels. An HTML file was created that used the include command to 
try and include files that were at different classification levels. In theory, the low session 
level server should not be able to access the higher level objects and report with an error 
message. The higher level server would have access to these lower level objects. The 
server responded correctly, serving only objects that the XTS TCB allowed access to. At 
the lower level, the high level objects were not included and not sent to the client. At the 
higher level, all lower level objects were included and sent to the client. This showed that 
the XTS TCB was correctly enforcing the access control policies on the server. 
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The server implementation on the XTS-300 platform in the MLS LAN was now 
complete. 
G. DOCUMENTATION MODIFICATIONS 
The maximum length of a filename on the XTS-300 is twenty-three characters. 
While transferring the Apache-provided files from a floppy disk to the XTS-300, some of 
the documentation file names were too long for the XTS-300. Thus some files had to be 
renamed. The table below shows a list of files that were renamed on the XTS-300 
platform. 
Original File Name Renamed as 
conf/highperformance.conf-dist conf/highperf .conf-dist 
htdocs/manual/content-negotiation.html htdocs/manual/content-neg.html 
htdocs/misc/known client _problei'ns.html htdocs/misc/known _problems.html 
Table 3 Renamed Apache Files 
These files were referenced in the following documentation files: 













Table4 Documentation Files Referencing Renamed Files 
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These documentation files were modified to reference the renamed files. Note that 
the file highpeiformance.confdist is an example file provided to help set up a 
configuration file for the server. It was not referenced in any of the documentation files. 
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V. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. DIRECTORY STRUCTURES AND FILE ACCESS 
The Apache Software Foundation Apache Security Tips web site has a lot of 
useful information for the basic installation of the Apache server and the web pages it 
serves [Ref. 27]. It suggests that all files, directories, and parent directories, on a Unix 
system, be owned by root and be write-able by root only. This is also suggested for the 
log files and log file directories [Ref. 27]. It is suggested that the server be only 
read/write-able by root, thus preventing any user from replacing the executable, but 
executable by all. In a MLS LAN environment, it is not practical for the log files to be 
restricted this way. The server is activated by the SSS as a user, so the user needs at least 
write permission to the log files and read permission for the server configuration files. 
Apache-based servers also use .htaccess files to read in user-defined directives. 
Users can configure these .htaccess files in their home directories. The user-defined 
directives can sometimes add insecure options to the server by overriding directives in the 
server configuration file. Directives can be placed in the server configuration file to 
prevent the server from using these files thereby preventing Administrative directives to 
be overridden and closing the potential security hole. 
B. APACHE ADD-ON MODULES 
Several of the Apache add-on modules are security related or can contribute to the 
overall security of the server. Directives for these modules placed in the server 
configuration file can create tighter security restrictions and access. Some of the more 
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common ones are discussed below. A complete listing of Apache provided modules is 
provided in Appendix I. 
1. mod_access: This module provides access control to directories based on the client 
hostname or IP address that is sent in a request header field. Access to the server on 
the XTS-300 is currently designed to be through the Trusted Path. This access is 
controlled by user identification and authorization and the session level. This module 
could be used within a company to provide additional policy granularity to 
discriminate among departments. If each department had different subnet addresses, 
directories could be allowed or denied access to according to the department subnet 
addresses. This module is configured in this implementation using the default values 
in the server configuration file. It could be useful in a MLS LAN environment to 
provide additional policy granularity. 
2. mod_auth, mod_auth_anon, mod_auth_db, mod_auth_dbm, mod_auth_digest, 
mod_digest: These modules provide for user authentication using various methods. 
With the NPS MLS LAN, the user is already identified and authorized before the 
server is started. These modules did not need to be configured in this implementation. 
It is recommended that some type of authentication method be used whether through 
Apache-provided modules or implementation provided. 
3. mod_autoindex: This module provides an automated file listing of a directory on the 
server if one is not present. By default, this module looks for an index.html file in the 
directory requested by the client. If this file is not present, the server creates a 
directory listing of all files in the directory and sends this listing in response to the 
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client's request. This module could be very informational and provide a great amount 
of detail about a directory. It could be used in a covert channel. The client could be 
searching directories looking for files the server can access. It is recommended that 
this module not be configured in a MLS LAN environment. 
4. mod_cem_meta: This module allows for CERN metafile semantics. Metafiles are 
HTTP headers that can be output in addition to the normal range of headers for each 
file accessed. This module can be used to provide a way to send extra information 
about a file, such as classification level, in a server response header line. This module 
is not configured in this implementation, but could be useful in a MLS LAN 
environment to provide additional information about the objects being served. 
5. mod_cgi, mod_actions: These modules provide for execution of Common Gateway 
Interface (CGI) scripts. The mod_cgi module can be used with the mod_include 
module to support server side includes (SSI) that execute cgi-scripts. It has been well 
documented that allowing users this capability (i.e. cgi) can very risky and insecure. If 
users are allowed to write their own scripts they can introduce many security holes, 
allowing crackers to find out information about the server, or even delete and 
overwrite files [Ref. 28]. To overcome the security issues, the server should only 
provide trusted cgi-scripts and not allow users to create their own [Ref. 29]. There are 
several useful web sites that address security issues related to CGI including the 
World Wide Web Consortium web site [Ref. 30] and Security Portal web site [Ref. 
31]. The mod_cgi module is configured in this implementation using the default 
values in the server configuration file. The mod_actions module is not configured 
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with this implementation. If these modules are configured in a MLS LAN 
environment, it is recommended that the Administrator fully research the security 
issues to ensure correct configuration. 
6. mod_headers: This module provides for user customizable response headers. This can 
be used to provide information about the classification of the object, the session level 
of the user or other security related parameters. This module is not configured in this 
implementation but could be useful in a MLS LAN environment to provide additional 
security related information about the objects the server is serving. 
7. mod_include: This module provides a handler for parsing files that include references 
to other files within them. It allows the server to dynamically build or add to a web 
page before sending it to the client. Using the server side include (SSI) statements in 
the web page, the server constructs the document before it is sent to the client. This is 
one way the server can handle web pages that contain links to higher levels of 
information. If the client is at a low session level and requests a page that has objects 
that are at higher levels, the high level objects will not be found and not sent to the 
client. Many of the security issues related to CGI are also related to SSI. Another 
security concern is the client's possible knowledge of the existence of files at higher 
levels. This module is currently configured in this server implementation to show 
proof of concept on creating dynamic web pages that contain references to different 
levels of classification. The use of SSI demonstrated the enforcement of the security 
policies on the server. This module could be useful in a MLS LAN environment to 
provide dynamic web pages containing objects at varying classification levels. 
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8. mod_info: This module provides comprehensive information about the server 
configuration. It provides information about the server configuration file, modules 
built into the server, and log file names. This is a very informational module but 
clients should not have access to the information it provides. It is recommended that 
this module not be configured in a MLS LAN environment. 
9. mod_log_config: This module provides a file logging mechanism. Several log files 
are supported including a request log that logs all requests made to the server. The 
request log file contains information such as the object being requested and the 
requesting client address. These log files, if used, need to be read-protected so clients 
can not read them. If users are allowed to read the customized error log, the 
information could be invaluable to a hacker as it can reveal problems with the server 
configuration and CGI scripts [Ref. 32]. However in this implementation, they need to 
be write-able by users to allow the server to write to them. They must also exist at all 
levels of classification. This module is not configured in this implementation. The 
default error log provided enough information for this implementation and a 
customized error log was not configured. Use of a ring mechanism might allow 
privileged access to these files while preventing casual access by users. This module 
could be useful in a MLS LAN environment to keep track of cgi-scripts and other 
objects that clients are requesting or to create custom logs for the server. 
10. mod_setenvif: This module is used to set environment variables based on the 
attributes of the request. It is used with mod_access to control access based on 
information in the client's header lines, i.e. whether the request has been redirected 
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from another untrusted site, information about the browser (secure or insecure). This 
module could be used within a company to provide additional policy granularity to 
discriminate among departments. This module is not configured in this 
implementation but could be useful in a MLS LAN environment to provide additional 
policy granularity. 
11. mod_speling: This module attempts to correct misspellings of URLs. This module is 
also very large and will greatly increase the size of the server. This is not a major 
security concern but clients knowing that this module is present, could try guessing 
games to see if they can access files on the server that they would otherwise not know 
were there. This module is not configured in this implementation and is not 
recommended in a MLS LAN environment. 
12. mod_status: This module provides information on the server status, activity, and 
performance. The client should have no need to know this information. With the 
ServerType as inetd, this module is useless. This module is not needed in this 
implementation. 
13. mod_userdir: This module allows users to have home web pages on the server. This 
privilege could lead to security issues if the user has cgi-scripts that others can access 
or if the cgi-script is badly written. This module is configured using the default values 
in the server configuration file. If this module is configured in a MLS LAN 
environment, the security issues related to the module should be investigated. 
14. mod_usertrack: This module allows the server to use cookies to track user activity. 
The server generates a "cookie", a unique identification number, and sends this 
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cookie to the client who stores the cookie in a file located on its machine. The only 
thing the client needs to store is the cookie number and the web server it was received 
from. The server stores information about the user (name, credit card number, 
preferences) in a log file on the server machine using the cookie as in index and key. 
Each time the client/user makes a request to this server, it will include the cookie. The 
server will use the cookie as an index into the file to retrieve information specific to 
the user. This cookie log file should not be readable by clients because the 
information contained in the file could be used by hackers to pose as other users to 
gain access to their information. This module is not configured in this 
implementation. If this module is configured in a MLS LAN environment, the log file 
needs to be created with the correct user access. 
15. mod_vhost_alias: This module creates dynamically configured virtual hosts (see 
Chapter II-A for an explanation on virtual hosts). This module, like mod-access, could 
be used within a company to provide additional policy granularity to discriminate 
among departments. This module is not configured in this implementation but could 
useful in a MLS LAN environment to provide addition policy granularity. 
C. SECURESOCKETLAYER 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL), also known as Transport Layer Security (TLS), is an 
encrypted communications protocol used to send information securely across networks. It 
is a layer that sits between the web server and the TCPIIP layers, transparently handling 
decryption and encryption on secure connections [Ref. 15]. The IETF RFC 2817 
discusses using SSLffLS with HTTP [Ref. 33]. SSL uses the HTTPS protocol ID and 
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listens to port number 443. Incorporating SSL into an Apache-based web server is more 
involved than just having the server listen to port 443 for requests. The Apache Software 
Foundation has a project called Apache-SSL that outlines the steps for adding SSL into 
an Apache-based web server and is described at its web site at www .apache-ssl.org [Ref. 
34]. This Apache project describes what needs to be done to make an Apache-based web 
server support SSL. 
There is also a commercially available third party add-on module, mod_ssl, that 
can be used with an Apache-based server. It can be downloaded from the mod_ssl web 
site, www .modssl.org [Ref. 35], along with instructions for incorporating it into an 
Apache-based server. SSL libraries from OpenSSL [Ref. 36] are also needed to support 
both the Apache-SSL software and the mod_ssl software. These can be downloaded from 
the OpenSSL web site, www.openssl.org [Ref. 35]. The OpenSSL libraries must be 
configured and compiled on the same platform as the Apache-based server. Once 
configured and compiled, the Apache-SSL software and/or the mod_ssl software can be 
compiled. At one time, the United States also required the RSAREF library for SSL in 
order to comply with patent regulations in the United States [Ref. 37]. This patent 
regulation has since expired. The RSAREF libraries had to be configured and compiled 
before the mod_ssl module could be compiled. The mod_ssl module relies on functions 
defined in the OpenSSL libraries. The mod_ssl module actually patches the Apache web 
server source code, so mod_ssl can not be built into the Apache server like most of the 
other add-on modules. The process is rather detailed and a step-by-step procedure needs 
to be followed to correctly obtain an Apache-based server that can support SSL. After the 
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compilation, there are several SSL server directives that need to be configured in the 
server configuration file. 
Once the Apache-based SSL server has been compiled and configured to listen to 
port 443, the job is not complete. The server should have a private key and a signed 
certificate from a recognized authority (IETF RFC 2585 discusses public keys and HTTP 
[Ref. 38]). These procedures described above are the minimum required to configure SSL 
into an Apache-based server. More steps are required if advanced SSL options are being 
considered. Incorporating SSL into an Apache-based web server takes time, research, 
software resources other than the Apache software, and testing. This undertaking is 
beyond the scope of this thesis and is referred as future follow-on work in the next 
chapter. 
61 
THIS PAGE 1NTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
62 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter provides answers to the questions asked in the first chapter. It 
suggests some topics for future work related to this thesis. 
A. DISCUSSION 
Several questions were posed at the beginning of this thesis questioning the 
possibility and ease of implementation of an Apache-based server on a high assurance 
multilevel secure platform and the effects it would have on the trustworthiness of this 
platform. All of these questions were answered indirectly throughout the thesis. The 
overall result is that an Apache-based server was successfully modified to operate on a 
high assurance host acting as a server in a MLS LAN. 
The structure of the Apache software is designed to support customized ports and 
platform specific web servers. The majority of the modifications was limited to a select 
few files. These were: two configuration scripts, one C language header file, and two C 
language source code files. These centralized changes will allow future Apache upgrades 
to be accomplished with relative ease on the XTS-300. 
This Apache-based server is constrained by access controls and policies enforced 
by the XTS-300 Trusted Computing Base. It causes no adverse side affects to this 
environment. The Apache-based server is an application layer protocol server that the 
MLS LAN Secure Session Server controls. It should not affect the trustworthiness or 
evaluation rating of the XTS-300. 
63 
B. FUTURE WORK 
This thesis can provide many follow-on projects. 
The Apache Software Foundation released a new version, 1.3.14, of the Apache 
web server just before this thesis was complete. There is also the 2.0 version that requires 
the GNU tools autoconf and libtool. Follow-on work could include do~nloading these 
versions and incorporating the changes made for the XTS Apache-based web server. This 
will provide the latest version of an Apache-based web server and also the GNU tools. 
Another follow on thesis would be to incorporate Secure Socket Layer (SSL) into 
the server. This was briefly discussed in Chapter V. Incorporating and testing an SSL 
Apache-based server would take considerable time and effort. This effort would provide 
an Apache-based server capable of serving https requests. It would also provide a server 
that is up to date with current Internet standards and advances. Additional study would be 
needed to determine if there are any security advantages to adding SSL for finer grained 
policies at the application level. 
Follow-on and continued work would be learning and investigating the many 
capabilities of an Apache-based web server. The Apache server has many add-on modules 
that add great flexibility and capabilities to servers. These were not explored in this thesis 
but should be explored in the future to maximize the utility of the server. 
A final area of interest would be to continue experiments with server side includes 
(SSI) to create dynamic web pages. The use of SSis was briefly investigated in this 
research to show proof of concept. 
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C. CONCLUSIONS 
This implementation of an Apache-based server on a high assurance multilevel 
platform was a success. The implementation process came with positive and negative 
experiences. The Apache-provided code was structured and written in such a way that 
modifications could be easily made and incorporated. This was a positive experience 
because it allowed the modifications to be centralized in a small amount of code. 
Working on the XTS-300 platform without a good debugging tool was difficult and 
challenging at times. This was a negative experience that added complications to the 
testing of the Apache-based server. However, it also provided a positive experience 
because without these complications the underlying timing issue might not have been 
noticed and corrected. The overall experience from this thesis was a very positive one, 
mostly due to the talented team of professionals that supported and helped with the effort. 
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY 
A commercially available HTTP web server application written by the 
Apache Software Foundation Project. 
Common Gateway Interface. A protocol for scripts to gather information 
from a user request and respond to it. 




Discretionary Access Control. A means of restricting access to objects 
based on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong [Ref. 
19]. 
Department of Defense 
File Transfer Protocol. The standard protocol of the Internet architecture 
for transferring files between hosts [Ref. 39]. 
Graphical Interchange Format. 
A foundation that provides software products and tools. 
HyperText Markup Language. A language used to construct World Wide 
Web pages [Ref. 39]. 
HyperText Transfer Protocol. An application level protocol based on a 
request/reply paradigm and used in the World Wide Web [Ref. 39]. 
Internet Engineering Task Force. A task force responsible for providing 
short-term engineering solutions for the Internet [Ref. 39]. 
The global internet based on the Internet (TCPIIP) architecture, connecting 
millions of hosts worldwide [Ref. 39]. 
Internet Protocol. A protocol that provides a connectionless, best-effort 
delivery service of datagrams across the Internet [Ref. 39]. 
An image in the Joint Photographic Experts Group format [Ref. 39]. 
Local Area Network. A network based on any physical network 
technology that is designed to span distances of up to a few thousand 
meters [Ref. 39]. 
Line Feed 
Mandatory Access Control. A means of restricting access to objects based 






















formal authorization of subjects to access information of such sensitivity 
[Ref. 19]. 
Multilevel Security. The ability of a system to contain information with 
different sensitivities that simultaneously permits access by users with 
different security clearances and needs-to-know, but prevents users from 
obtaining access to information for which they lack authorization [Ref. 
40]. 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Request For Comment 
Secure Attention Key 
The provider of a service in a client/server distributed system [Ref. 39]. 
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol 
Secure Session Server 
Server Side Include 
Secure Socket Layer. A protocol layer that runs over TCP to provide 
authentication and encryption of connections. Also known as Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) [Ref. 39]. 
The Unix-like Operating System used on the Wang XTS-300 platform. 
Trusted Computing Base 
Trusted Computing Base Extension 
Transmission Control Protocol over Internet Protocol 
Transmission Control Protocol. Connection-oriented transport protocol of 
the Internet architecture. TCP provides a reliable, byte-stream delivery 
service [Ref. 39]. 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 
Remote terminal protocol of the Internet architecture. Telnet allows you to 
interact with a remote system as if your terminal is directly connected to 
that machine [Ref. 39]. 
Transport Layer Security. Also known as Secure Socket Layer. 
Trusted Path Server. 
Uniform resource identifier. Formatted strings that identify, via name, 
location, or any other characteristic, a resource. [Ref. 5] (Defined in IETF 
RFC 2396 [Ref. 6].) 
Uniform resource locator. Formatted strings that identify the location of 




World Wide Web. A hypermedia information service on the Internet [Ref. 
39]. 
A combination of a multilevel secure operating system and a Pentium 
based computer. 
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APPENDIX B: APACHE SOFTWARE LICENSE FILE 
!* ==================================================================== 
* The Apache Software License, Version 1.1 
* 
* Copyright (c) 2000 The Apache Software Foundation. All rights 
* reserved. 
* 
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
* are met: 
* 
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
* 
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 










The end-user documentation included with the redistribution, 
if any, must include the following acknowledgment: 
"This product includes software developed by the 
Apache Software Foundation (http://www.apache.org/) ." 
Alternately, this acknowledgment may appear in the software itself, 
if and wherever such third-party acknowledgments normally appear. 
* 4. The names "Apache" and "Apache Software Foundation" must 
* not be used to endorse or promote products derived from this 
* software without prior written permission. For written 
* permission, please contact apache@apache.org. 
* 
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "Apache", 
* nor may "Apache" appear in their name, without prior written 
* permission of the Apache Software Foundation. 
* 
*THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED 
* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES 
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE 
* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE APACHE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION OR 
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, 
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT 
* LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF 
* USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND 
* ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, 
* OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT 
* OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF 
* SUCH DAMAGE. 
* ==================================================================== 
* 
* This software consists of voluntary contributions made by many 
* individuals on behalf of the Apache Software Foundation. For more 
* information on the Apache Software Foundation, please see 
* <http://www.apache.org/>. 
* 
* Portions of this software are based upon public domain software 
* originally written at the National Center for Supercomputing Applications, 
* University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. 
*I 
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APPENDIX C: DIRECTORY LISTING 
This is a complete directory listing of the Apache-based server files on the XTS-
300. The top-level directory is apachel3. Files that were modified for this 
implementation are in bold. Files in bold-italics only had debug statements added to 

























































































































































































































































































































Makef ile. conf ig 















































































































































































Makefile experimental/ modules_ 
proxy/ example/ extra/ 
apachel3/src/modules/exarnple: 



















Makefile.tmpl mod_auth_digest.c mod_rnrnap_static.c 
apache13/src/modules/extra: 







































































Makefile.tmpl ebcdic.c os-inline.c os.h 
bs2login.c ebcdic.h os.c 
apache13/src/os/mpeix: 
Makefile.tmpl gettimeofday.c os-inline.c os.h 
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unix/ win32/ 









































































apache.iwz installdll/ readme.txt 
apache13/src/os/win32/installer/installdll: 
core install.def install.roak 
install.c install.dsp test/ 
apachel3/src/os/win32/installer/installdll/test: 
resource.h test.def test.h test.roak 




























































































APPENDIX D: MODIFICATIONS TO CONFIGURATION FILES 
The following additions were made to the GuessOS file: 
############################## 
# 




echo "${SYSTEM}-xts300-stop4.4"; exit 0 
i i 
############################## 
The following additions were made to the Configure file: 
########################## 
# 





CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -g -DXTS -I/usr2/shifflet/wip/include 
DUSE_P_SOCKET" 
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -lcass -lrnw -lsocket -lgen" 
LIBS="$LIBS -L/lib -lsocket -lrnw -lgen -L/usr/lib -lcrypt -
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APPENDIX E: MODIFICATIONS TO SOURCE CODE 
All changes and additions are indicated by bold face type. 
1. The following changes were made to ap_getpass() function in the 
ap_getpass.c file: 
#if defined (XTS) I* added for XTS *I 
(int) pw_got = getpass(prompt); 
#else 
pw_got = getpass(prompt); 
#endif I* end add for XTS *I 
2. The following line was modified in the initgroup() function in the util.c file: 
#if defined(QNX) II defined(MPE) II defined(BEOS) II defined(TPF) II 
defined( __ TANDEM) I I defined(NETWARE) I I defined(XTS) I* mod for XTS *I 
3. The following two functions, ap_read() and ap_write(), were found to be the 
low-level functions that called the XTS system read() and write() functions. They are 
defined in the buff.c source file. The changes made allow the functions to communicate 
with both pseudo socket and network sockets. 
/* the lowest level reading primitive */ 
static int ap_read(BUFF *fb, void *buf, int nbyte) 
{ 
#ifdef USE_P_SOCKET 




I* added for XTS *I 
I* end add for XTS *I 
if (fb->hFH != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { 
if (!ReadFile(fb->hFH,buf,nbyte,&rv,NULL)) 
errno = GetLastError(); 




rv PREAD(fb->fd_in, buf, nbyte); I* mod for XTS *I 
return rv; 
/* the lowest level writing primitive */ 
static int ap_write(BUFF *fb, const void *buf, int nbyte) 
{ 
#ifdef USE_P_SOCKET 




I* added for XTS *I 
I* end add for XTS *I 
if (fb->hFH != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { 
if (!WriteFile(fb->hFH,buf,nbyte,&rv,NULL)) 
errno = GetLastError(); 
rv = -1; 
else 
#endif 
#if defined (B_SFIO) 
rv = sfwrite(fb->sf_out, buf, nbyte); 
#else 
#ifdef _OSD_POSIX 
/* Sorry, but this is a hack: On BS2000, currently the send{) call 
* has slightly better performance, and it doesn't have a maximum 
* transfer size of 16kB per write. Both write() and writev() 
* currently have such a limit and therefore don't work 
* too well with MMAP files. 
*I 
if (fb->flags & B_SOCKET) 
rv = send(fb->fd, buf, nbyte, 0); 
else 
#endif 
TMP_OUT_l {tmpf_outbuff, 0 ap_write nbyte [%d] \n", nbyte, tmpf); 
rv = PWRITE(fb->fd, buf, nbyte); I* mod for XTS *I 
#endif 
return rv; 
4. This following lines of code were added to the beginning of the source code 
file http_main.c. They define a signal handler and the functions needed to communicate 










FILE *tmpf = NULL; 
II internal functions to handle read with timeout 
void handler(int signo) 
{ 
II do nothing, just return 
int debug_on = 0; 
if (tmpf) { 
TMP_OUT_1(tmpf_out,"received signal [%d]\n", signo, tmpf); 
dbugd (debug_on, "handler () : entered signo = " , signo); 
I* Wait for input to be available in the PSKT 
* Accepts: timeout in seconds 
* Returns: 1 if have input, else 0 
*I 




fd_set rfd, xfd; 
struct timeval tmo; 
tmo.tv_sec = seconds; tmo.tv_usec 0; 
FD_ZERO (&rfd); 
FD_ZERO ( &xfd) ; 
FD_SET (my_fd,&rfd); 
FD_SET (my_fd,&xfd); 
sel_res = pskt_select_cli(my_fd+1,&rfd,O,&xfd,&tmo); 
if (FD_ISSET(my_fd,&xfd)) 
{ 
result = -1; 





sel_res ? 1 : 0; 
0 i 
return result; 
int psin_with_pause(char *s, int length) 
{ 
II Do a 'zero' delay select, 
II just in case data is waiting there 
II and we have already gotten the signal 
II from the SSS child process 
II TMP_OUT_O ("in psin_with_pause () \n", tmpf); 
long wait_res server_input_wait(O); 
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if ( !wait_res) 
{ 
II Nothing waiting, pause until data is available 
I I TMP_OUT_O ("in psin_with_pause () pausing\n", tmpf); 
pause (); 
} 
if (wait_res == -1) 
{ 
I I TMP_OUT_O ("in psin_with_pause () returning 0\n", tmpf); 
return ( 0); 
}else{ 
if (errno == EINTR) errno = 0; 
I I TMP _OUT_O ("in psin_wi th_pause () calling 
pskt_read_stop_at_cli () \n", tmpf); 
int tmp_res = pskt_read_from_cli(my_fd, s, length); 
I I TMP_OUT_O ("in psin_with_pause () pskt_read_stop_at_cli () all 
done\n", tmpf); 
TMP_OUT_1 (tmpf_out, "Read len [%d] \n", tmp_res, tmpf); 




II Do a 'zero' delay select, 
II just in case data is waiting there 
II and we have already gotten the signal 
II from the SSS child process 
long wait_res = server_input_wait(O); 
if ( !wait_res) 
{ 
} 
II Nothing waiting, pause until data is available 
pause(); 




if (errno == EINTR) errno = 0; 
return(pskt_read_char_cli(my_fd)); 
int pbout_handler(char c) 
{ 
int again= 2; II Retry twice after full buffer 
int result = 0; 
while ((result != EOF) && (result != 1)) { 
result= pskt_write_char_svr (my_fd, c); 
if (!result) { 
II The PSKT buffer must be full, 
if (!again) { 
errno = ENOSPC; 
result = EOF; 
}else{ 
II Wait, then try again 
poll(NULL, 0, 100); II Use poll to get 0.1 second delay 
again--; II decrease remaining chances 
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return result; 
int psout_handler(char *s, int total_len) 
{ 
int again= 2; II Retry twice after full buffer 
int result = 0; 
int tmplen = total_len; 
char *tmp_s = s; 
TMP_OUT_1 (tmpf_out, "psout_handler writing [%d] \n", tmplen, tmpf); 
while ((result != EOF) && (result != total_len)) { 
result = pskt_write_to_svr(my_fd, tmp_s, tmplen); 
TMP_OUT_1 (tmpf_out, "result is [%d] \n", result, tmpf); 
if (!result) { 
if (!again) { 
errno = ENOSPC; 
result = EOF; 
}else{ 
poll(NULL, 0, 100); II Use poll to get 0.1 second delay 
again--; II decrease remaining chances 
} 
}else if (result != tmplen) 
tmplen -= result; 
tmp_s += result; 
result = 0; 
again= 2; II reset remaining chances 
poll(NULL, 0, 100); II Use poll to get 0.1 second delay 
}else{ 
II result= strlen(s); II We wrote it all out, return full 
size 




5. The following lines were added to the http_main.c source file to setup the 
SIGURG signal handler: 
/************************* 
* 







6. The following lines were changed in http_main.c because the XTS-300fcntl() 
function expects different data types than those being used: 
while ((ret= fcntl(lock_fd, F_SETLKW, (int)&lock_it)) < 0 && errno == 
EINTR) { I* mod for XTS *I 
while ((ret= fcntl(lock_fd, F_SETLKW, (int)&unlock_it)) < 0 && errno == 
EINTR) { I* mod for XTS *I 
7. This is the main function call in http_main.c. The changes added for this 
Apache-based implementation are in bold. 








* ADDED FOR XTS 
* 
*************************I 
#ifdef USE_P_SOCKET I* added for XTS *I 
char tmplogfile[BO]; 
Sprintf(tmplogfile, 0 ltmplhttp_l0g.tmp 0 ); 
tmpf = fopen(tmplogfile, 0 a+ 0 ); 
if(tmpf == NULL) { 
printf( 0 failed to open %s\n", tmplogfile); 
} 
if(chmod(tmplogfile, 438)) { 
printf("failed to chmod on %s\n", tmplogfile); 
} 
II FILE *tmpf2 = freopen(tmplogfile, "a", stdout); 
TMP_OUT_O("hello world\n",tmpf); 
TMP_OUT_l(tmpf_out,"Started HTTPD pid is [%d]\n", getpid(), tmpf); 
#endif II end add for XTS 
#ifdef SecureWare 
if (set_auth_parameters(argc, argv) < 0) 
perror("set_auth_parameters"); 
if (getluid() < 0) 
if (setluid(getuid()) < 0) 
perror("setluid"); 









ecbptr()->ebrout = PRIMECRAS; 




if ((s = strrchr(argv[O), PATHSEPARATOR}} !=NULL} { 
ap_server_argvO = ++s; 
else { 
ap_server_argvO argv[O); 











}} != -1} 
nz: II 
new = (char **)ap_push_array(ap_server_post_read_config}; 
*new= ap_pstrdup(pcommands, optarg); 
break; 
case 'C': 
new = (char **)ap_push_array{ap_server_pre_read_config); 
*new= ap_pstrdup(pcommands, optarg}; 
break; 
case 'D': 
new = (char **)ap_push_array(ap_server_config_defines}; 
*new= ap_pstrdup(pcommands, optarg}; 
break; 
case 'd': 












































I* just ignore this option here, because it has only 
* effect when SHARED CORE is used and then it was 
























ap_suexec_enabled = init_suexec() i 
server_conf = ap_read_config(pconf, ptrans, ap_server_confname)i 
if (ap_configtestonly) { 





child_timeouts !ap_standalone I I one_process; 
#ifdef BEOS 
/* make sure we're running in single_process mode - Yuck! */ 






















server_conf->error_log = NULL; 
#ifdef SCOREBOARD_FILE 
scoreboard_fd = input_parms.child.scoreboard_fd; 
ap_scoreboard_irnage = &_scoreboard_irnage; 























I* Only try to switch if we're running as MANAGER.SYS *I 
if (geteuid() == 1 && ap_user_id > 1) { 
GETPRIVMODE(); 
if (setuid(ap_user_id) == -1) { 
GETUSERMODE(); 
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, server_conf, 






I* Only try to switch if we're running as root *I 
if (!geteuid() && setuid(ap_user_id) == -1) { 
ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, server_conf, 






exit (0); ' 
#ifdef TPF 
I* TPF's Internet Daemon passes the incoming socket nbr (inetd mode 
only) *I 
sock_in = sock_out = input_parms.parent.socket; 
I* TPF also needs a signal set for alarm in inetd mode *I 
signal(SIGALRM, alrm_handler); 
#elif defined(MPE) 
I* HP MPE 5.5 inetd only passes the incoming socket as stdin (fd 0}, 
whereas HPUX inetd passes the incoming socket as stdin (fd 0) and stdout 
(fd 1). 
Go figure. SR 5003355016 has been submitted to request that the 
existing functionality be documented, and then to enhance the 
functionality to be like HPUX. *I 
sock_in = fileno(stdin); 
sock_out = fileno(stdin); 
#else 
sock_in = fileno(stdin); 








int sbmid, debug_on = 1; 




II Find our PSKT, using the PSKT Map DB 
result= access_pmap_db(}; 
if (result == PMAP_iNiTiALiZED} 
{ 
struct passwd *pw; 
unsigned long euid; 
euid = geteuid (}; 
if (pw = getpwuid (euid}} 
{ 
result = get_pskt_handle(pw->pw_name, my_sess_level, 
&:pskt_handle}; 
}else{ 





TMP_OUT_O("Could NOT access PMAP DB\n", tmpf}; 
exit(l}; 
if (result == PMAP_FOUND} 
{ 
TMP_OUT_l(tmpf_out,"Using PSKT [%d]\n", pskt_handle, tmpf}; 
}else{ 
} 
TMP_OUT_O("Could NOT find PSKT\n", tmpf}; 
exit(l}; 
II initialize access to the PSKT 
result = pskt_attach(pskt_handle}; 
if (result != PSKT_iNiTiALiZED} 
{ 
} 
TMP_OUT_O ( "pskt_attach error\n", tmpf}; 
exit(l}; 
II find the PSKT connection we are supposed to use 
result = pskt_find_connection(getpid(), ~y_fd}; 
if (result != PSKT_FOUND} 
{ 
TMP_OUT_O("pskt_find_connection error\n", tmpf}; 
exit(l}; 
}else{ 
TMP_OUT_l(tmpf_out,"Using PSKT fd [%d]\n", my_fd, tmpf}; 
} 
II make sure we handle signals from the SSS child process 
sigset(SiGORG, handler}; 
II make sure we speed up data transfer with flush calls 
II pskt_flush_required(}; 
sock_in = my_fd; 
sock_out = my_fd; 
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#endif 
1 = sizeof(sa_client); 
if ((GETPEERNAME(sock_in, &sa_client, &1)) < 0) {I* mod for XTS *I 
!* get peername will fail if the input isn't a socket */ 
perror ( "getpeername" ) ; 
memset(&sa_client, '\0', sizeof(sa_client)); 
1 = sizeof(sa_server); 
if (GETSOCKNAME(sock_in, &sa_server, &1) < 0) { I* mod for XTS *I 
perror ( "getsockname" ) ; 
fprintf(stderr, "Error getting local address\n"); 
exit (1); 
server_conf->port = ntohs(({struct sockaddr_in *) &sa_server)-
>sin_port); 
TMP_OUT_1(tmpf_out,"Server port [%d]\n", server_conf->port, tmpf); 
cio = ap_bcreate(ptrans, B_RDWR I B_SOCKET); 
cio->fd = sock_out; 
cio->fd_in = sock_in; 
conn = new_connection(ptrans, server_conf, cio, 
(struct sockaddr_in *) &sa_client, 
(struct sockaddr_in *) &sa_server, -1); 
I************************* 
* 






result = pskt_set_aps_ready(my_fd); 
if (result != PSKT_FOUND) 
{ 
} 
TMP_OUT_O("pskt_set_aps_ready error\n", tmpf); 
exit(l}; 
II end add for XTS 
while ((r = ap_read_request(conn)) !=NULL) 
if (r->status == HTTP_OK) 
ap_process_request(r); 






8. The following code was added to the function child_sub_main() in 
http_main.c to define the SIGURG signal handler when the pseudo sockets are not being 
used: 




#endif /* end add for XTS */ 
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APPENDIX F: MODIFICATIONS TO HEADER FILES 








typedef int pid_t; 















#define NEED_INITGROUPS I* need groups *I 
#undef HAVE_MMAP I* do not have mmap() *I 
#define HAVE_SHMGET I* do support shmget() *I 
#undef HAVE_GMTOFF I* no gmtoffset function *I 
#undef HAVE_CRYPT_H I* no crypt.h header file *I 
#undef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H I* no syslresource.h header file *I 
#undef USE_MMAP_SCOREBOARD I* do not use mmap *I 
#undef USE_SHMGET_SCOREBOARD I* do not use shmget *I 
#define USE_LONGJMP I* use the long jump functions *I 
#define USE_FCNTL_SERIALIZED_ACCEPT I* use this option for fcntl() *I 
#define NO_MMAP I* do not have mmap() *I 
#define NO_KILLPG I* do not have killpg() *I 
#define NO_SETSID I* do not have setsid() *I 
#define NO_USE_SIGACTION I* do not use sigaction() *I 





#define S_ISLNK(mode) 0 
#define NO_WRITEV 
I* system gettimeofday only wants one 
I* need difftime() *I 
I* no symbolic links set to 0 (false) *I 
I* do not use writev() *I 
#define HTTPD_ROOT "lusr21bersacklhttp" 
#define SERVER_CONFIG FILE "lusr21bersacklhttplconf/httpd.conf" 
#undef PLATFORM 
#define PLATFORM "XTS-300" 
#define STDIN_FILENO 0 
#define STDOUT_FILENO 1 
#define STDERR_FILENO 2 
#define SIGCHLD SIGCLD I* redefine SIGCHLD to SIGCHD *I 
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II set up stuff for pseudo sockets 
#ifndef USE_P_SOCKET II not using pseudo sockets 
#define PBIN getc 
#define PSIN fgets 
#define PREAD read 
#define PSIN_RET fgets 
#define PBOUT putchar 
#define PSOUT fputs 
#define PWRITE write 
#define PFLUSH fflush 
#define PFEOF feof 
#define PFERROR ferror 
#define PCLEARERR clearerr 
#define PUNGETC ungetc 
#define GETPEERNAME getpeername 
#define GETSOCKNAME getsockname 
#else II pseudo socket definitions 
#include "pmap_db.h" II to find our PSKT 
#include "pskt.h" II to access our PSKT 
#include "util.h" I I for check_access 
#define PBIN(fd) pbin_with_pause() 
#define PSIN(s,n,fd) psin_with_pause(s,n) 
#define PREAD(fd,s,n) psin_with_pause(s,n) 
#define PSIN_RET(s,n,fd) ((PSIN(s, n, fd)) ? s NULL) 
#define PBOUT(c) pbout_handler (c) 
#define PSOUT(s) psout_handler (s,strlen(s)) 
#define PWRITE(fd,s,n) psout_handler (s,n) 
#define PFLUSH(fd) pskt_flush(my_fd); 
#define PFEOF(fd) pskt_error(my_fd) 
#define PFERROR(fd) pskt_error(my_fd) 
#define PCLEARERR(fd) II NOOP 
#define PUNGETC(c,fd) pskt_ungetc_cli(my_fd, c) 
#define GETPEERNAME(fd,addr,len) pskt_get_peer(my_fd,addr,len) 
#define GETSOCKNAME(fd,addr,len) pskt_get_host(my_fd,addr,len) 
#define TMP_OUT_O(s,fd) fwrite{s, strlen(s), 1, fd); fflush(fd); 
#define TMP_OUT_1(dest,s,a1,fd) sprintf(dest, s, a1); fwrite(dest, 
strlen(dest), 1, fd); fflush(fd); 




APPENDIX G: TOP LEVEL MAKEFILE 
This is the listing of the top-level Makefile generated by the Configure script. The 
platform specific lines for the XTS are indicated in bold. 
## 
## Apache Makefile, automatically generated by Configure script. 
## Hand-edited changes will be lost if the Configure script is re-run. 
## Sources: - ./Makefile.config (via Configuration) 











## Inherited Makefile options from Configure script 

















CFLAGSl= -g -DXTS -I/usr2/shifflet/wip/include -DUSE_P_SOCKET 









LIBSl= -L/lib -lsocket -lmw -lgen -L/usr/lib -lcrypt 
-L/usr2/shifflet/wip/lib -lut_cass -lcass 
## 
## (End of automatically generated section) 
## 
CFLAGS=$(0PTIM) $(CFLAGS1) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) 
LIBS=$(EXTRA_LIBS) $(LIBS1) 










$(CC) -c $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAGS) $< 
# Used to generate import library for OS/2 
.SUFFIXES: .de£ 
.def.a: 
emximp -o $@ $< 
all: Configuration $(TARGET) 
Configuration: Configuration.tmpl 
@echo "++File 'Configuration' older than 'Configuration.tmpl' ," 
@echo "++ or still doesn't exist. Please consider copying 
'Configuration. tmpl'" 
@echo "++to 'Configuration', editing and rerunning 'Configure'." 
@echo "++If not, you will at least have to touch 'Configuration'." 
@false 
$(TARGET): $(EXTRA_DEPS) $(SUBTARGET) 
target_static: subdirs modules.o 
$(CC) -c $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAGS) buildmark.c 
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS_SHLIB_EXPORT) \ 
-o $(TARGET) buildmark.o $(0BJS) $(REGLIB) $(EXPATLIB) $(LIBS) 
target_compile_only: subdirs modules.o 
$(CC) -c $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAGS) buildmark.c 
target_shared: $(SHCORE_IMPLIB) $(SHARED_CORE_EP) 
lib$(TARGET) .$(SHLIB_SUFFIX_NAME) 
$(CC) $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS_SHLIB_EXPORT) \ 
-o $(TARGET) -DSHARED_CORE_BOOTSTRAP main/http_main.c \ 
ap/libap.a $(LIBS) $(SHCORE_IMPLIB) 
lib$(TARGET) .ep: lib$(TARGET) .$(SHLIB_SUFFIX_NAME) 
$(CC) $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS_SHLIB_EXPORT) \ 
-o lib$(TARGET) .ep -DSHARED_CORE_TIESTATIC main/http_main.c\ 
-L. -l$(TARGET) $(LIBS) 
lib$(TARGET) .$(SHLIB_SUFFIX_NAME): subdirs modules.o 
$(CC) -c $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAGS) buildmark.c 
$(LD_SHLIB) $(LDFLAGS_SHLIB) -o lib$(TARGET) .$(SHLIB_SUFFIX_NAME) 
buildmark.o $(0BJS) $(REGLIB) $(EXPATLIB) $(LD_SHCORE_DEF) $(LD_SHCORE_LIBS) 
@if [ ". $ ( SHLIB_SUFFIX_LIST) " ! = . ] ; then \ 
rm -f lib$(TARGET) .$(SHLIB_SUFFIX_NAME).*; \ 
for suffix in $(SHLIB_SUFFIX_LIST) ""; do\ 
[ ".$$suffix" = . J && continue; \ 
echo "ln lib$(TARGET).$(SHLIB_SUFFIX_NAME) 
lib$(TARGET) .$(SHLIB_SUFFIX_NAME) .$$suffix"; \ 
ln lib$(TARGET) .$(SHLIB_SUFFIX_NAME) 




@for i in $(SUBDIRS); do \ 
echo "===> $(SDP)$$i"; \ 
case ".$(OS)" in\ 
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.OS390 I .TPF) ( cd $$i && $(MAKE) SDP='$(SDP)' ) II exit 1;; \ 
*) ( cd $$i && $(MAKE) $(MFLAGS_STATIC) SDP='$(SDP)' 
CC='$(CC)' AUX_CFLAGS='$(CFLAGS)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB) ') I I exit 1;; \ 
esac; \ 




@echo "===> $(SDP)support"; \ 
cd support; $(MAKE) $(MFLAGS_STATIC) SDP='$(SDP)' CC='$(CC)' 
AUX_CFLAGS='$(CFLAGS)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB)' I I exit 1; \ 
clean: 
\ 
echo "<=== $(SDP)support" 
-rm -f $(TARGET) lib$(TARGET) .* *.o 
@fori in $(SUBDIRS); do\ 
echo "===> $(SDP)$$i"; \ 
( cd $$i && $(MAKE) $(MFLAGS_STATIC) SDP='$(SDP)' $@ ) I I exit 1; 




-rm -f $(TARGET) lib$(TARGET) .* *.o 
@fori in $(SUBDIRS); do\ 
echo "===> $(SDP)$$i"; \ 
( cd $$i && $(MAKE) $(MFLAGS_STATIC) SDP='$(SDP)' $@ ) I I exit 1; 
echo "<=== $(SDP)$$i"; \ 
done 
-rm -f include/ap_config_auto.h 
-rm -f modules.c 
-rm -f modules/Makefile 
-rm -f regex/Makefile 
-rm -f lib/Makefile 
-rm -f Makefile.config 
-rm -f Makefile 
install: 
@echo"++ Sorry, no installation procedure available at this level." 
@echo"++ Go to the parent directory for an 'install' target." 
# We really don't expect end users to use this rule. It works only with 
# gee, and rebuilds Makefile.tmpl. You have to re-run Configure after 
# using it. 
depend: 
cp Makefile.tmpl Makefile.tmpl.bak \ 
&& sed -ne '1,/A# DO NOT REMOVE/p' Makefile.tmpl > Makefile.new \ 
&& gee -MM $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAGS) *.c >> Makefile.new \ 
&& sed -e 'l,$$s: $(INCDIR)/: $$(INCDIR)/:g' \ 
-e 'l,$$s: $(0SDIR)/: $$(0SDIR)/:g' Makefile.new \ 
> Makefile.tmpl \ 
&& rm Makefile.new 
fori in $(SUBDIRS); do\ 
( cd $$i && $(MAKE) CC='$(CC)' AUX_CFLAGS='$(CFLAGS)' 
RANLIB='$(RANLIB)' depend ) I I exit 1; \ 
done 
#Dependencies 
$(OBJS): Makefile subdirs 
# DO NOT REMOVE 
buildmark.o: buildmark.c include/ap_config.h include/ap_mmn.h \ 
99 
include/ap_config_auto.h os/unix/os.h include/ap_ctype.h \ 
include/hsregex.h include/httpd.h include/alloc.h include/buff.h \ 
include/ap.h include/util_uri.h 
modules.o: modules.c include/httpd.h include/ap_config.h \ 
include/ap_mmn.h include/ap_config_auto.h os/unix/os.h \ 
include/ap_ctype.h include/hsregex.h include/alloc.h include/buff.h \ 
include/ap.h include/util_uri.h include/http_config.h 
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APPENDIX H: SERVER CONFIGURATION FILE 
This is the final server configuration file, httpd.conf, used with this 
implementation. The changes are in bold. 
# 
# Based upon the NCSA server configuration files originally by Rob McCool. 
This is the main Apache server configuration file. It contains the 
configuration directives that give the server its instructions. 
See <URL:http://www.apache.org/docs/> for detailed information about 
the directives. 


































what they do. They're here only as hints or reminders. If you are unsure 
consult the online docs. You have been warned. 
After this file is processed, the server will look for and process 
@@ServerRoot@@/conf/srm.conf and then @@ServerRoot@@/conf/access.conf 
unless you have overridden these with ResourceConfig and/or 
AccessConfig directives here. 
configuration directives are grouped into three basic sections: The 
l. Directives that control the operation of the Apache server process as a 
whole (the 'global environment'). 
2. Directives that define the parameters of the 'main' or 'default' server, 
which responds to requests that aren't handled by a virtual host. 
These directives also provide default values for the settings 
of all virtual hosts. 
3. Settings for virtual hosts, which allow Web requests to be sent to 
different IP addresses or hostnames and have them handled by the 
same Apache server process. 
Configuration and logfile names: If the filenames you specify for many 
of the server's control files begin with "/" (or "drive:/" for Win32), 
server will use that explicit path. If the filenames do *not* begin 
with"/", the value of ServerRoot is prepended --so "logs/foo.log" 
with ServerRoot set to "/usr/local/apache" will be interpreted by the 
server as "/usr/local/apache/logs/foo.log". 
### Section 1: Global Environment 
# 
# The directives in this section affect the overall operation of Apache, 
# such as the number of concurrent requests it can handle or where it 




# ServerType is either inetd, or standalone. Inetd mode is only supported on 




# ServerRoot: The top of the directory tree under which the server's 
# configuration, error, and log files are kept. 
# 
# NOTE! If you intend to place this on an NFS (or otherwise network) 
# mounted filesystem then please read the LockFile documentation 
# (available at <URL:http://www.apache.org/docs/mod/core.html#lockfile>); 
# you will save yourself a lot of trouble. 
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# 




# The LockFile directive sets the path to the lockfile used when Apache 
# is compiled with either USE_FCNTL_SERIALIZED_ACCEPT or 
# USE_FLOCK_SERIALIZED_ACCEPT. This directive should normally be left at 
# its default value. The main reason for changing it is if the logs 
# directory is NFS mounted, since the lockfile MUST BE STORED ON A LOCAL 
# DISK. The PID of the main server process is automatically appended to 




# PidFile: The file in which the server should record its process 




# ScoreBoardFile: File used to store internal server process information. 
# Not all architectures require this. But if yours does (you'll know because 
# this file will be created when you run Apache) then you *must* ensure that 




# In the standard configuration, the server will process this file, 
# srm.conf, and access.conf in that order. The latter two files are 
# now distributed empty, as it is recommended that all directives 
# be kept in a single file for simplicity. The commented-out values 
#below are the built-in defaults. You can have the server ignore 
# these files altogether by using "I dev /null" (for Unix) or 









# KeepAlive: Whether or not to allow persistent connections (more than 




# MaxKeepAliveRequests: The maximum number of requests to allow 
# during a persistent connection. Set to 0 to allow an unlimited amount. 




# KeepAliveTimeout: Number of seconds to wait for the next request from the 





# Server-pool size regulation. Rather than making you guess how many 
# server processes you need, Apache dynamically adapts to the load it 
# sees --- that is, it tries to maintain enough server processes to 
# handle the current load, plus a few spare servers to handle transient 
#load spikes (e.g., multiple simultaneous requests from a single 
# Netscape browser) . 
# 
# It does this by periodically checking how many servers are waiting 
# for a request. If there are fewer than MinSpareServers, it creates 
# a new spare. If there are more than MaxSpareServers, some of the 










#Limit on total number of servers running, i.e., limit on the number 
# of clients who can simultaneously connect --- if this limit is ever 
# reached, clients will be LOCKED OUT, so it should NOT BE SET TOO LOW. 
# It is intended mainly as a brake to keep a runaway server from taking 




# MaxRequestsPerChild: the number of requests each child process is 
# allowed to process before the child dies. The child will exit so 
# as to avoid problems after prolonged use when Apache (and maybe the 
# libraries it uses) leak memory or other resources. On most systems, this 
# isn't really needed, but a few (such as Solaris) do have notable leaks 
# in the libraries. For these platforms, set to something like 10000 







NOTE: This value does not include keepalive requests after the initial 
request per connection. For example, if a child process handles 
an initial request and 10 subsequent "keptalive" requests, it 
would only count as 1 request towards this limit. 
MaxRequestsPerChild 0 
# 
# Listen: Allows you to bind Apache to specific IP addresses and/or 






# BindAddress: You can support virtual hosts with this option. This directive 
# is used to tell the server which IP address to listen to. It can either 
#contain"*", an IP address, or a fully qualified Internet domain name. 





# Dynamic Shared Object (DSO) Support 
# 
# To be able to use the functionality of a module which was built as a DSO you 
# have to place corresponding 'LoadModule' lines at this location so the 
# directives contained in it are actually available _before_ they are used. 
# Please read the file README.DSO in the Apache 1.3 distribution for more 
# details about the DSO mechanism and run 'httpd -1' for the list of already 
# built-in (statically linked and thus always available) modules in your httpd 
# binary. 
# 
# Note: The order is which modules are loaded is important. Don't change 
# the order below without expert advice. 
# 
# Example: 
# LoadModule foo_module libexec/mod_foo.so 
# 
# ExtendedStatus controls whether Apache will generate "full" status 
# information (ExtendedStatus On) or just basic information (ExtendedStatus 
# Off) when the "server-status" handler is called. The default is Off. 
# 
#ExtendedStatus On 
# See if we can include the module mod_include 
# for server side includes 
# AddModule mod_include 
### Section 2: 'Main' server configuration 
# 
# The directives in this section set up the values used by the 'main' 
# server, which responds to any requests that aren't handled by a 
# <VirtualHost> definition. These values also provide defaults for 
# any <VirtualHost> containers you may define later in the file. 
# 
# All of these directives may appear inside <VirtualHost> containers, 
# in which case these default settings will be overridden for the 
# virtual host being defined. 
# 
# 
# If your ServerType directive (set earlier in the 'Global Environment' 
#section) is set to "inetd", the next few directives don't have any 
# effect since their settings are defined by the inetd configuration. 
# Skip ahead to the ServerAdmin directive. 
# 
# 
# Port: The port to which the standalone server listens. For 




# If you wish httpd to run as a different user or group, you must run 










User/Group: The name (or #number) of the user/group to run httpd as. 
On SCO (ODT 3) use "User nouser" and "Group nogroup". 
. On HPUX you may not be able to use shared memory as nobody, and the 
suggested workaround is to create a user www and use that user. 
NOTE that some kernels refuse to setgid(Group) or semctl(IPC_SET) 
when the value of (unsigned)Group is above 60000; 







# ServerAdmin: Your address, where problems with the server should be 
# e-mailed. This address appears on some server-generated pages, such 




# ServerName allows you to set a host name which is sent back to clients for 
#your server if it's different than the one the program would get (i.e., use 
# "www" instead of the host's real name). 
# 
# Note: You cannot just invent host names and hope they work. The name you 
# define here must be a valid DNS name for your host. If you don't understand 
# this, ask your network administrator. 
# If your host doesn't have a registered DNS name, enter its IP address here. 
#You will have to access it by its address (e.g., http:/1123.45.67.89/) 




# DocumentRoot: The directory out of which you will serve your 
# documents. By default, all requests are taken from this directory, but 




# Each directory to which Apache has access, can be configured with respect 
# to which services and features are allowed and/or disabled in that 
# directory (and its subdirectories) . 
# 








# Note that from this point forward you must specifically allow 
# particular features to be enabled - so if something's not working as 








#This may also be "None", "All", or any combination of "Indexes", 
# "Includes", "FollowSymLinks", "ExecCGI", or "MultiViews". 
# 
# Note that "MultiViews" must be named *explicitly* --- "Options All" 
# doesn't give it to you. 
# 
Options Indexes FollowSymLinks MultiViews 
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# 
# This controls which options the .htaccess files in directories can 
#override. Can also be "All", or any combination of "Options", "Fileinfo", 




# Controls who can get stuff from this server. 
# 
Order allow,deny 
Allow from all 
</Directory> 
# 
# Now changes so server side includes can be used 
# 
AddType text/html .shtml 





# UserDir: The name of the directory which is appended onto a user's home 






# Control access to UserDir directories. The following is an example 
# for a site where these directories are restricted to read-only. 
# 
#<Directory /home/*/public_html> 
# AllowOverride Fileinfo AuthConfig Limit 
# Options MultiViews Indexes SymLinksifOwnerMatch IncludesNoExec 
# <Limit GET POST OPTIONS PROPFIND> 
# Order allow,deny 
# Allow from all 
# </Limit> 
# <LimitExcept GET POST OPTIONS PROPFIND> 
# Order deny,allow 




# Directoryindex: Name of the file or files to use as a pre-written HTML 






# AccessFileName: The name of the file to look for in each directory 





# The following lines prevent .htaccess files from being viewed by 
# Web clients. Since .htaccess files often contain authorization 
# information, access is disallowed for security reasons. Comment 
# these lines out if you want Web visitors to see the contents of 
# .htaccess files. If you change the AccessFileName directive above, 
# be sure to make the corresponding changes here. 
# 
# Also, folks tend to use names such as .htpasswd for password 
# files, so this will protect those as well. 
# 
<Files - "A\.ht"> 
Order allow,deny 
Deny from all 
</Files> 
# 
# CacheNegotiatedDocs: By default, Apache sends "Pragma: no-cache" with each 
# document that was negotiated on the basis of content. This asks proxy 
# servers not to cache the document. Uncommenting the following line disables 




# UseCanonicalName: (new for 1.3) With this setting turned on, whenever 
# Apache needs to construct a self-referencing URL (a URL that refers back 
# to the server the response is coming from) it will use ServerName and 
# Port to form a "canonical" name. With this setting off, Apache will 
# use the hostname:port that the client supplied, when possible. This 




# TypesConfig describes where the mime.types file (or equivalent) is 






# DefaultType is the default MIME type the server will use for a document 
# if it cannot otherwise determine one, such as from filename extensions. 
# If your server contains mostly text or HTML documents, "text/plain" is 
# a good value. If most of your content is binary, such as applications 
# or images, you may want to use "application/octet-stream" instead to 





# The mod_mime_magic module allows the server to use various hints from the 
# contents of the file itself to determine its type. The MIMEMagicFile 
# directive tells the module where the hint definitions are located. 
# mod_mime_magic is not part of the default server (you have to add 
# it yourself with a LoadModule [see the DSO paragraph in the 'Global 
# Environment' section], or recompile the server and include mod_mime_magic 
#as part of the configuration), so it's enclosed in an <IfModule> container. 
# This means that the MIMEMagicFile directive will only be processed if the 







# HostnameLookups: Log the names of clients or just their IP addresses 
#e.g., www.apache.org (on} or 204.62.129.132 (off}. 
# The default is off because it'd be overall better for the net if people 
# had to knowingly turn this feature on, since enabling it means that 





# ErrorLog: The location of the error log file. 
# If you do not specify an ErrorLog directive within a <VirtualHost> 
# container, error messages relating to that virtual host will be 
# logged here. If you *do* define an error logfile for a <VirtualHost> 




# LogLevel: Control the number of messages logged to the error_log. 
# Possible values include: debug, info, notice, warn, error, crit, 




# The following directives define some format nicknames for use with 
# a CustomLog directive (see below}. 
# 
#LogFormat "%h %1 %u %t \"%r\" %>s %b \"%{Referer}i\" \"%{User-Agent}i\"" 
combined 
#LogFormat "%h %1 %u %t \"%r\" %>s %b" common 
#LogFormat "%{Referer}i -> %U" referer 
#LogFormat "%{User-agent}i" agent 
# 
# The location and format of the access logfile (Common Logfile Format} . 
# If you do not define any access logfiles within a <VirtualHost> 
# container, they will be logged here. Contrariwise, if you *do* 
# define per-<VirtualHost> access logfiles, transactions will be 
# logged therein and *not* in this file. 
# 
#CustomLog logs/access_log common 
# 
# If you would like to have agent and referer logfiles, uncomment the 
# following directives. 
# 
#CustomLog logs/referer_log referer 
#CustomLog logs/agent_log agent 
# 
# If you prefer a single logfile with access, agent, and referer information 
# (Combined Logfile Format} you can use the following directive. 
# 
#CustomLog logs/access_log combined 
# 
# Optionally add a line containing the server version and virtual host 
# name to server-generated pages (error documents, FTP directory listings, 
# mod_status and mod_info output etc., but not CGI generated documents}. 
# Set to "EMail" to also include a mailto: link to the ServerAdmin. 
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# Aliases: Add here as many aliases as you need (with no limit). The format is 




# Note that if you include a trailing I on fakename then the server will 
#require it to be present in the URL. So "/icons" isn't aliased in this 
# example, only "/icons/" .. 
# 
Alias /icons/ "@@ServerRoot@@/icons/" 
<Directory "@@ServerRoot@@/icons"> 
Options Indexes MultiViews 
AllowOverride None 
Order allow,deny 
Allow from all 
</Directory> 
# 
# ScriptAlias: This controls which directories contain server scripts. 
# ScriptAliases are essentially the same as Aliases, except that 
# documents in the realname directory are treated as applications and 
# run by the server when requested rather than as documents sent to the 
client. 
# The same rules about trailing "/" apply to ScriptAlias directives as to 
# Alias. 
# 
ScriptAlias /cgi-bin/ "@@ServerRoot@@/cgi-bin/" 
# 
# "@@ServerRoot@@/cgi-bin" should be changed to whatever your ScriptAliased 






Allow from all 
</Directory> 
</IfModule> 
# End of aliases. 
# 
# Redirect allows you to tell clients about documents which used to exist in 
# your server's namespace, but do not anymore. This allows you to tell the 
# clients where to look for the relocated document. 
# Format: Redirect old-URI new-URL 
# 
# 









# Addicon* directives tell the server which icon to show for different 
# files or filename extensions. These are only displayed for 
# Fancyindexed directories. 
# 
AddiconByEncoding (CMP,/icons/compressed.gif) x-compress x-gzip 
AddiconByType (TXT,/icons/text.gif) text/* 
AddiconByType (IMG,/icons/image2.gif) image/* 
AddiconByType (SND,/icons/sound2.gif) audio/* 
AddiconByType (VID,/icons/movie.gif) video/* 
Addicon /icons/binary.gif .bin .exe 
Addicon /icons/binhex.gif .hqx 
Addicon /icons/tar.gif .tar 
Addicon /icons/world2.gif .wrl .wrl.gz .vrml .vrm .iv 
Addicon /icons/compressed.gif .Z .z .tgz .gz .zip 
Addicon /icons/a.gif .ps .ai .eps 
Addicon /icons/layout.gif .html .shtml .htm .pdf 
Addicon /icons/text.gif .txt 
Addicon /icons/c.gif .c 
Addicon /icons/p.gif .pl .py 
Addicon /icons/f.gif .for 
Addicon /icons/dvi.gif .dvi 
Addicon /icons/uuencoded.gif .uu 
Addicon /icons/script.gif .conf .sh .shar .csh .ksh .tel 
Addicon /icons/tex.gif .tex 
Addicon /icons/bomb.gif core 
Addicon /icons/back.gif 
Addicon /icons/hand.right.gif README 
Addicon /icons/folder.gif AADIRECTORYAA 
Addicon /icons/blank.gif AABLANKICONAA 
# 
# Defaulticon is which icon to show for files which do not have an icon 




# AddDescription allows you to place a short description after a file in 
# server-generated indexes. These are only displayed for Fancyindexed 
# directories. 
# Format: AddDescription "description" filename 
# 
#AddDescription "GZIP compressed document" .gz 
#AddDescription "tar archive" .tar 
#AddDescription "GZIP compressed tar archive" .tgz 
# 
# ReadmeName is the name of the README file the server will look for by 
# default, and append to directory listings. 
# 
# HeaderName is the name of a file which should be prepended to 
# directory indexes. 
# 
# If MultiViews are amongst the Options in effect, the server will 
# first look for name.html and include it if found. If name.html 
# doesn't exist, the server will then look for name.txt and include 






# Indexignore is a set of filenames which directory indexing should ignore 
# and not include in the listing. Shell-style wildcarding is permitted. 
# 
Indexignore .??* *-*#HEADER* README* RCS CVS *,v *,t 
</IfModule> 






# AddEncoding allows you to have certain browsers (Mosaic/X 2.1+) uncompress 
# information on the fly. Note: Not all browsers support this. 
# Despite the name similarity, the following Add* directives have nothing 
# to do with the Fancyindexing customization directives above. 
# 
AddEncoding x-compress Z 
AddEncoding x-gzip gz tgz 
# 
# AddLanguage allows you to specify the language of a document. You can 
# then use content negotiation to give a browser a file in a language 
# it can understand. 
# 
# Note 1: The suffix does not have to be the same as the language 
# keyword --- those with documents in Polish (whose net-standard 
# language code is pl) may wish to use "AddLanguage pl .po" to 
# avoid the ambiguity with the common suffix for perl scripts. 
# 
# Note 2: The example entries below illustrate that in quite 
# some cases the two character 'Language' abbriviation is not 
# identical to the two character 'Country' code for its country, 
# E.g. 'Danmark/dk' versus 'Danish/da'. 
# 
# Note 3: In the case of 'ltz' we violate the RFC by using a three char 
# specifier. But there is 'work in progress' to fix this and get 
# the reference data for rfc1766 cleaned up. 
# 
# Danish (da) - Dutch (nl) - English (en) - Estonian (eel 
# French (fr) - German (de) - Greek-Modern (ell 
# Italian (it) - Portugese (pt) - Luxembourgeois* (ltz) 
# Spanish (es) - Swedish (sv) - Catalan (ca) - Czech(cz) 
# Polish (pl) - Brazilian Portuguese (pt-br) - Japanese (ja) 
# 
AddLanguage da .dk 
AddLanguage nl .nl 
AddLanguage en .en 
AddLanguage et .ee 
AddLanguage fr .fr 
AddLanguage de .de 
AddLanguage el .el 
AddLanguage it .it 
AddLanguage ja .ja 
AddCharset IS0-2022-JP .jis 
AddLanguage pl .po 
AddCharset IS0-8859-2 .iso-pl 
AddLanguage pt .pt 
AddLanguage pt-br .pt-br 
AddLanguage ltz .lu 
AddLanguage ca .ca 
AddLanguage es .es 
AddLanguage sv .se 
AddLanguage cz .cz 
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# LanguagePriority allows you to give precedence to some languages 
# in case of a tie during content negotiation. 
# 
# Just list the languages in decreasing order of preference. We have 
# more or less alphabetized them here. You probably want to change this. 
# 
<IfModule mod_negotiation.c> 
LanguagePriority en da nl et fr de el it ja pl pt pt-br ltz ca es sv 
</IfModule> 
# 
# AddType allows you to tweak mime.types without actually editing it, or to 
# make certain files to be certain types. 
# 
#For example, the PHP 3.x module (not part of the Apache distribution- see 
# http://www.php.net) will typically use: 
# 
#AddType application/x-httpd-php3 .php3 
#AddType application/x-httpd-php3-source .phps 
# 
# And for PHP 4.x, use: 
# 
#AddType application/x-httpd-php .php 
#AddType application/x-httpd-php-source .phps 
AddType application/x-tar .tgz 
# 
# AddHandler allows you to map certain file extensions to "handlers", 
# actions unrelated to filetype. These can be either built into the server 
# or added with the Action command (see below) 
# 
# If you want to use server side includes, or CGI outside 
# ScriptAliased directories, uncomment the following lines. 
# 
# To use CGI scripts: 
# 
#AddHandler cgi-script .cgi 
# 
# To use server-parsed HTML files 
# 
#AddType text/html .shtml 
#AddHandler server-parsed .shtml 
# 
# Uncomment the following line to enable Apache's send-asis HTTP file 
# feature 
# 
#AddHandler send-as-is asis 
# 
# If you wish to use server-parsed imagemap files, use 
# 
#AddHandler imap-file map 
# 
# To enable type maps, you might want to use 
# 
#AddHandler type-map var 
</IfModule> 
# End of document types. 
# 
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# Action lets you define media types that will execute a script whenever 
# a matching file is called. This eliminates the need for repeated URL 
# pathnames for oft-used CGI file processors. 
# Format: Action media/type /cgi-script/location 
# Format: Action handler-name /cgi-script/location 
# 
# 
# MetaDir: specifies the name of the directory in which Apache can find 
# meta information files. These files contain additional HTTP headers 




# MetaSuffix: specifies the file name suffix for the file containing the 




# Customizable error response (Apache style) 
# these come in three flavors 
# 
# 1) plain text 
#ErrorDocument 500 "The server made a boo boo. 
# n.b. the (") marks it as text, it does not get output 
# 
# 2) local redirects 
#ErrorDocument 404 /missing.html 
# to redirect to local URL /missing.html 
#ErrorDocument 404 /cgi-bin/missing_handler.pl 
# N.B.: You can redirect to a script or a document using server-side-includes. 
# 
# 3) external redirects 
#ErrorDocument 402 http://some.other_server.com/subscription_info.html 
# N.B.: Many of the environment variables associated with the original 
# request will *not* be available to such a script. 
# 




# The following directives modify normal HTTP response behavior. 
#The first directive disables keepalive for Netscape 2.x and browsers that 
# spoof it. There are known problems with these browser implementations. 
# The second directive is for Microsoft Internet Explorer 4.0b2 
# which has a broken HTTP/1.1 implementation and does not properly 
# support keepalive when it is used on 301 or 302 (redirect) responses. 
# 
BrowserMatch "Mozilla/2" nokeepalive 
BrowserMatch "MSIE 4\.0b2;" nokeepalive downgrade-1.0 force-response-1.0 
# 
# The following directive disables HTTP/1.1 responses to browsers which 
# are in violation of the HTTP/1.0 spec by not being able to grok a 
# basic 1.1 response. 
# 
BrowserMatch "RealPlayer 4\.0" force-response-1.0 
BrowserMatch "Java/1\.0" force-response-1.0 




#Allow server status reports, with the URL of http://servername/server-status 
#Change the ".your_domain.com" to match your domain to enable. 
# 
#<Location /server-status> 
# SetHandler server-status 
# Order deny,allow 
# Deny from all 
# Allow from .your_domain.com 
#</Location> 
# 
# Allow remote server configuration reports, with the URL of 
# http://servername/server-info (requires that mod_info.c be loaded). 
# Change, the ".your_domain.com" to match your domain to enable. 
# 
#<Location /server-info> 
# SetHandler server-info 
# Order deny,allow 
# Deny from all 
# Allow from .your_domain.com 
#</Location> 
# 
# There have been reports of people trying to abuse an old bug from pre-1.1 
# days. This bug involved a CGI script distributed as a part of Apache. 
# By uncommenting these lines you can redirect these attacks to a logging 




# Deny from all 
# ErrorDocument 403 http://phf.apache.org/phf_abuse_log.cgi 
#</Location> 
# 
# Proxy Server directives. Uncomment the following lines to 






# Order deny,allow 
# Deny from all 
# Allow from .your_domain.com 
#</Directory> 
# 
#Enable/disable the handling of HTTP/1.1 "Via:" headers. 
# ("Full" adds the server version; "Block" removes all outgoing Via: 
headers) 




# To enable the cache as well, edit and uncomment the following lines: 









#NoCache a_domain.com another_domain.edu joes.garage_sale.com 
#</IfModule> 
# End of proxy directives. 
### Section 3: Virtual Hosts 
# 
# VirtualHost: If you want to maintain multiple domains/hostnames on your 
# machine you can setup VirtualHost containers for them. 
#Please see the documentation at <URL:http://www.apache.org/docs/vhosts/> 
# for further details before you try to setup virtual hosts. 
# You may use the command line option '-S' to verify your virtual host 
# configuration. 
# 
# If you want to use name-based virtual hosts you need to define at 





# VirtualHost example: 
# Almost any Apache directive may go into a VirtualHost container. 
# 
#<VirtualHost ip.address.of.host.some_domain.com> 
# ServerAdmin webmaster@host.some_domain.com 
# DocumentRoot /www/docs/host.some_domain.com 
# ServerName host.some_domain.com 
# ErrorLog logs/host.some_domain.com-error_log 
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APPENDIX 1: APACHE MODULES 
Apache Add-On Modules 
Module Name Type Description Security 
Related 
mod_access Access Control Provides access control based on y 
client hostname or IP address 
mod_actions Dynamic Content Provides for executing CGI y 
scripts based on media type or 
request method. Module lets you 
run CGI scripts whenever a file 
of a certain type is requested. 
This makes it much easier to 
execute scripts that process files 
mod_alias URLmapping Provides for mapping different N 
parts of the host filesystem in the 
document tree, and for URL 
redirection 
mod_asis HTTP response Provides for .asis files. Any N 
document with mime type 
httpd/send-as-is will be 
processed by this module. Allow 
file types to be defined such that 
Apache sends them without 
adding HTTP headers 
mod_auth Access Control Provides for user authentication y 
using textual files 
mod_auth_anon Access Control Allows "anonymous" user access y 
to authenticated areas 
mod_auth_db Access Control For user authentication using y 
Berkeley DB files 
mod_auth_dbm Access Control Provides for user authentication y 
using DBM files 
mod_auth_digest Access Control Provides for user authentication y 
using MD5 Digest 
Authentication 
mod_autoindex Directory Handling Provides for automatic directory y 
indexing 
mod browser Obsolete Obsolete in 1.3. * 
mod_cem_meta HTTP response Provides for CERN httpd y 
metafile semantics; meta 
information is descriptive 
information contained in the file 
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mod_cgi Dynamic Content Provides for execution of y 
Common Gateway Interface 
(CGD scripts 
mod_ cookies Obsolete Obsolete in 1.3. * 
mod_ digest Access Control Provides for user authentication y 
using MD5 Digest 
Authentication 
mod_dir Directory Handling Provides for "trailing slash" N 
redirects and serving directory 
index files 
mod dld Obsolete Obsolete in 1.3. * 
mod dll Obsolete Obsolete in 1.3. * 
mod_env Environment Provides for passing y 
environment variables to 
CGI/SSI scripts 
mod_ example Development Provides example code for N 
writing user defined modules 
mod_ expires HTTP response Provides for generation of N 
Expires HTTP headers (refers to 
document validity and 
persistence 
mod_headers HTTP response Provides for customization of y 
user headers 
mod_imap Misc. Processes *.map files, imagemap N 
files 
mod_include Dynamic Content Provides a handler for parsing y 
files before they are sent to the 
client 
mod_info Internal Content Provides for comprehensive y 
server configuration 
mod_isapi Dynamic Content Implements Internet Server extension API 
for Windows 
mod log_ agent Obsolete Obsolete in 1.3. * 
mod log_ common Obsolete Obsolete in 1.3. * 
mod_log_config Logging Provides for logging of requests y 
made to the server 
mod log_ referer Obsolete Obsolete in 1.3. * 
mod_mime Content type Provides for determining types of N 
files from the filename 
(determine meta information 
about documents) 
mod_mime_magic Content type Provides for determining the N 
MIME type of a file, like the file 
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command in UNIX 
mod_mmap_static Misc. Provides mmapping() of a N 
statically configured list of 
frequently requested but not 
changed files (experimental) 
mod_negotiation Content type Provides for content negotiation, N 
selection of the document that 
best matches the clients 
capabilities 
mod_proxy Misc. Implements a proxy/cache for y 
Apache 
mod_rewrite URLmapping Provides a rule-based rewriting N 
engine to rewrite requested 
URLs on the fly 
mod_setenvif Environment Provides the ability to set y 
environment variables based 
upon attributes of the request 
mod_so Misc. Provides for loading of N 
executable code and modules 
into the server at start-up or 
restart time (experimental) 
mod_speling URLmapping Attempts to correct misspellings y 
ofURLs 
mod_status Internal Content Provides information on server y 
status, activity, and performance 
mod_userdir URLmapping Provides for user specific y 
directories, allows users to home 
web pages 
mod_usertrack Logging Uses cookies to provide for a y 
clickstream log of user activity 
on a site 
mod_ vhost_alias URLmapping Creates dynamically configured y 
virtual hosts by allowing the IP 
address and/or Host: header of 
the HTTP request to be used as 
part of the pathname to 
determine what files to serve 
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